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Theoretically based in a Judaic philosophy and in Kafka’s related mythology, which 
locates the origins of the world in language, this thesis takes its practical starting point from a 
relatively little-documented writing method of Kafka that appears inseparably linked to his 
language mythology.  This writing method is one in which Kafka developed the fictional world 
of his narratives out of language or associations in language.  In a unique attempt to document 
its full impact on the development of a literary text, the thesis seeks to utilize this writing 
method as a reading method, identifying the verbal associations from which Kafka wrote one of 
his most recognized narratives, the short story “In der Strafkolonie.” 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
An Overview of Franz Kafka’s Law and Language Mythology ................................................. 1 
A Judaic Language Philosophy and Kafka’s Language Mythology ........................................... 6 
Kafka’s Method of Writing through Verbal Associations ...................................................... 14 
The Thesis and Method of Reading Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” .............................. 17 
Chapter I: In the Penal Colony, under the Old Law ............................................................... 25 
I.1.The Law as a Machine ...................................................................................................... 26 
I.2.The Structure of the Machine .......................................................................................... 28 
I.3.One Principle: the Certainty of Guilt ................................................................................ 32 
I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case ..................................................................... 33 
I.5.The Law as an Execution ................................................................................................... 36 
I.6.The Execution Procedure.................................................................................................. 37 
I.7.The Precious Legal Documents of the Old Commandant ................................................ 39 
I.8.Reading the Documents and Knowing Justice with Closed Eyes ..................................... 43 
I.9.The Undeclared Judgment of the Condemned Man ........................................................ 45 
I.10.Deciphering the Documents as Wounds ........................................................................ 47 
Chapter II: In the Penal Colony, under the New Law ............................................................. 51 
II.1.The Explanations of the Officer ....................................................................................... 52 
II.2.Persuasive, in Part, but No Power ................................................................................... 54 
II.3.Listening to the [Ex-] Followers in the Teahouse ............................................................ 56 
II.4.The Lies of the Condemned Man .................................................................................... 58 
vii 
 
II.5.The Human(e) Ideals of the Traveler ............................................................................... 60 
II.6.The Human Apparatus ..................................................................................................... 61 
II.7.The Many Heads of the Court ......................................................................................... 65 
II.8.The Traveler’s Authority and Judgment .......................................................................... 68 
II.9.The Revenge of the Condemned Man ............................................................................. 71 
II.10.The Destruction of the Machine and the Death of the Officer ..................................... 72 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 75 
Works Consulted ................................................................................................................. 78 











“Im Anfang war das Wort […]”1  
“The extent of speech must needs be vast, since it is nearly commensurate to thought itself […]”-Isaac Barrow2   
 
Theoretically based in a Judaic philosophy and in Kafka’s related mythology, which 
locates the origins of the world in language, this thesis takes its practical starting point from a 
relatively little-documented writing method of Kafka that appears inseparably linked to his 
language mythology.  This writing method is one in which Kafka developed the fictional world 
of his narratives out of language or associations in language.  In a unique attempt to document 
its full impact on the development of a literary text, the thesis seeks to utilize this writing 
method as a reading method, identifying the verbal associations from which Kafka wrote one of 
his most recognized narratives, the short story “In der Strafkolonie.”  
 
An Overview of Franz Kafka’s Law and Language Mythology 
Franz Kafka (1883-1924), undeniably one of the most profound and impactful writers, 
not just in twentieth century German literary history, but in all of German literary history, is 
widely recognized among Kafka scholars as a type of philosopher of language and writer of 
                                                          
1 Johannes 1:1. 
2 The Works of the Learned Isaac Barrow (131). 
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language myths.  Scholars who study Kafka’s language mythology almost invariably link it, 
however, to a more fundamental legal mythology.  Indeed, according to the studies of many 
well-known Kafka scholars, such as Wilhelm Emrich, Walter Sokel, and Clayton Koelb, the Law, 
or the meaning of the Law, does not just define a few of Franz Kafka’s literary works in 
particular, but is the primary pursuit of his life and literature in general.  Allen Thiher succinctly 
reflects the findings of these scholars in his book Fiction Refracts Science, when he writes: 
“Nearly every novel or story by Kafka at least implies some attempt to know the nature of the 
law, or das Gesetz, that all desire to know” (137).  These scholars have long seen in Kafka more 
than simply one of the great literary giants of the twentieth century.  For them, Kafka is also a 
brilliant legal philosopher, whose works offer penetrative insight into the nature of the Law, 
and he accomplishes this in its most abstract and varied sense.  As Thiher has also written, 
“Kafka’s work lays bare the ambivalent senses that attach to the concept of the law” (137).  For 
these scholars Kafka is, among countless other things, one of the great humanist thinkers, 
political minds, religious theologians, and language philosophers of the twentieth century, 
whose legal myths, or symbols of the Law in his fictional narratives, are equally profound as 
they are ambiguous.  According to the studies of these scholars, the only certain characteristic 
of Kafka’s mythological Law is that it is an indecipherable Law: it is absent from the world.  In 
his book Franz Kafka, one of the most comprehensive and well-known studies among the works 
of these scholars, Wilhelm Emrich, for example, appears to define Kafka, among many other 
things, as a humanist thinker in the broadest sense.  Emrich appears to attribute a perceptive 
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genius to Kafka through which his literary works achieve a kind of universal law in the unbridled 
expression of all human possibility in thought and being:  
Der universelle Überblick wird also dadurch gewonnen, daß Kafka allen 
menschlichen Möglichkeiten schrankenlos Raum läßt.  Das gilt nicht nur für […] 
die logischen Denkmöglichkeiten, sondern überhaupt für das gesamte bewußte 
und unterbewußte Dasein des Menschen. (37) 
And yet, Emrich’s study of Kafka’s life and works is colored throughout with the double-
awareness that Kafka’s universal law, while humanistic, is absolutely different than human law.  
For Emrich, the “limits of the human,” or what he calls “die Grenzen der Menschheit,” 
necessarily separate mankind from the universal law in Kafka’s mythology (44).  In his essay 
“Freedom and Authority in the Fiction of Franz Kafka,” the long-time and famous Kafka scholar, 
Walter Sokel, who is well-known for his early and comprehensive studies in Kafka’s irony, 
appears to operate from the same perspective as Emrich, though in a less abstract sense.  Sokel 
appears to regard Kafka as a profound political philosopher and his myths, which are often set 
in abstract political or legal courts, as more literal depictions of the Law.  For Sokel, Kafka’s 
search for the past unity of the “Ideal Law,” in his letters and fictional narratives, is eternally 
impeded through the divided presence of the “Actual Law.”  According to Sokel, it is for this 
reason that Kafka’s legal myths, particularly the symbolism of freedom and authority in his 
fictional narratives, tend to be so strangely ambiguous and fully divided in representation.  He 
writes: “Kafka’s representations of the theme of freedom and authority make him appear to be 
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both a master of subversion, a champion of the individual’s protest and revolt, and, at the same 
time, one of the most subtle and consummate eulogists absolute power has found in modern 
literature” (The Myth of Power 311).  In a more abstract approach, Clayton Koelb, who is well-
known for his study on Kafka’s language mythology, hints at the vast number of scholars since 
Max Brod who have interpreted the Jewish Kafka’s legal myths as part of a negative theology 
within a Judeo-Christian framework.3  Koelb identifies in Kafka’s legal mythology the search for 
the “absolute Whole,” a sacred Truth that is absent from the profane Truth present in the 
world: “The poignancy of much of Kafka’s fiction lies in his continuing commitment to a sacred 
realm of truth, law, and epistemological and ethical certainty, with which one cannot make 
secure contact” (101).   
Kafka’s legal mythology is almost invariably associated by Kafka scholars, such as 
Clayton Koelb and Walter Sokel, with an equally abstract and ambiguous language mythology.  
Allen Thiher nicely sums up this association, when he writes that Kafka’s diaries, letters, and 
fictional narratives all appear rooted, to some extent, in “modern doubts that the law […] can 
                                                          
3 There is a well-established tradition of interpreting Kafka’s literary works as part of a negative Judeo-Christian 
theology, in all its profundity and ambiguity.  Max Brod, the first Kafka scholar and one of Kafka’s long-time and 
closest friends, is well-known for his interpretation of Kafka’s texts allegorically, as a salvation history but with all 
the complications and terror necessarily resulting from the finite human’s relationship to an infinite God.  Other 
scholars, like Sabina Kienlechner, see in Kafka’s texts, at least in part, depictions of a negative religion and the 
painful and endless search for an absent God.  Kienlechner, in Negativität der Erkenntnis im Werk Franz Kafkas, 
writes extensively on Kafka’s personal and literary reflections on the biblical fall of man or on the Sündenfall, a 
myth that, for Kafka, signified, among many other things, mankind’s lost connection to the truth.  Other scholars, 
like Ritchie Robertson and Ralf R. Nicolai, see an ironic reversal in Kafka’s negative theology.  For Robertson, Kafka 
is concerned with the estrangement of the modern world from absolute values, but also asks whether some 
degree of estrangment is necessary for living.  For Nicolai, the lost paradise, through the Sündenfall, is regained, in 
Kleist and Kafka, in the reverse or from the backdoor.    
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be revealed through language, at least human language” (139).  According to these scholars, 
Kafka’s search for the absent Law, in his life and literary works, is inextricably bound to the 
writer, to the reading of verbal texts, and to the presence of human language.  For Clayton 
Koelb, in Kafka’s Rhetoric: The Passion of Reading, the absent Law in Kafka’s diaries, letters, and 
fictional narratives is inseparably linked to the presence of verbal texts: “[For Kafka] the present 
text becomes a reminder of the absence of that for which the text stands” (73).  According to 
Koelb, the absent Law, in Kafka’s language mythology, ultimately leads to both a violent or 
deadly mode of reading verbal texts and to an antithetical human mode.  With intended 
reference to the images of “In der Strafkolonie,” Koelb writes: “The text is most effective when 
it makes the reader painfully aware of his distance from [the text’s] origin” (73).  And he also 
writes: “[…] a book, capable of being misread, its meaning ignored or unseen, would have the 
complex, ambiguous (vieldeutig) quality of persons, not the deadly mechanical character of an 
apparatus” (89).  For Walter Sokel, in his essay “Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of Franz 
Kafka,” Kafka associates an absent Truth with the presence of language, and he does this, 
according to Sokel, from both a “naturalist” and a “spiritualist” perspective.  From the 
“naturalist” perspective, Kafka, as a German-speaking Jew and isolated writer of subjective, 
metaphoric signifiers, has lost access to the community and to the Truth.  From the “spiritualist 
perspective,” Kafka has lost access to the Truth, because language, as metaphor, can only refer 
to the sensory world.  Sokel covers both perspectives when he writes: “[For Kafka] metaphoric 
speech is untruth […]” (Myth of Power 85).  Kafka’s twentieth century language mythology, or 
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his association of the absent Law with the presence of human language, as shown in the studies 
of Walter Sokel and Clayton Koelb, appears inseparably linked to a writing method through 
which he developed his legal myths or fictional language narratives, such as “In der 
Strafkolonie” (1914), out of associations in language.  The particular nature of this writing 
method can be traced, perhaps most fundamentally however, to a traditional Judaic language 
philosophy, which locates the origins of the existing world within the vast network of 
associations in the Hebrew language of the Torah, or Jewish Written Law.                                        
 
A Judaic Language Philosophy and Kafka’s Language Mythology  
Franz Kafka, a writer widely recognized for his profound and ambiguous philosophy of 
language and his various language myths, remains strangely little recognized for a writing 
method, through which he developed a myth, or the fictional world of a narrative, almost 
entirely out of associations in language or from associations in his word choice.  This writing 
method, while linked to twentieth century Kafka and his language mythology, appears most 
fundamentally rooted in forms of a traditional Judaic language philosophy.  According to 
scholars, such as Detlef Kremer and Erich Grözinger, this philosophy, of which the highly 
educated Kafka was clearly aware, originates in ancient biblical conceptions of the world and 
essentially identifies it, and its development, with language.4  Detlef Kremer, a highly regarded 
                                                          
4 While many scholars have rightly criticized the narrow, Judeo-theological approach to Kafka, they have also never 
ceased to affirm the fundamental validity of it, beginning with Max Brod.  Brod and countless scholars after him 
have recognized Kafka’s obsession with his Jewish roots, his studies and influences in the Hebrew Bible, the 
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Kafka scholar, defines it in the strict sense, in a comprehensive study on Kafka’s philosophy of 
writing and writing method.  Kremer explains that within Judaic philosophy, God’s creation of 
the world is a verbal creation: “In jüdischer Sicht stellt sich die gesamte Weltschöpfung als eine 
verzögerte Sprachschöpfung dar (132).”  Ultimately, the world’s entire history, according to 
Kremer’s further delineation, is not created by God, but consists in the never-ending network of 
associations that originate from and center around his name: “[der Prozeß der Weltgeschichte] 
besteht in einer unendlichen Variation und Meditation über den Eigennamen Gottes […]” (132).  
In the strict sense of this traditional Judaic language philosophy, according to Kremer, the 
existing world, from its absolute origins through the entirety of its development, is nothing but 
language or a verbal text.  Karl Erich Grözinger sums this up nicely, in a study of Kafka and the 
language philosophies of the Kabbalah, when he writes: “Gott selbst ist diese schöpferische 
Sprache [und] die ganze Welt ist wie die Tora nichts anderes als […] ein […] Text” (156-157).            
As both Kremer and Grözinger demonstrate, however, traditional Judaic language 
philosophy’s strict association of the existing world with a verbal text is also hardly a simple or 
unambiguous association.  According to Grözinger, for instance, one logical consequence of a 
world that is language, particularly within the Kabbalah, is the creative power of humans: “Ist 
                                                          
Hebrew language, eastern Judaism, the Yiddish theater, and the Zionist movement, for example.  Erich Grözinger, 
in particular, notes that Kafka’s knowledge of the creative power of language in Kabbalah, while to some extent 
verifiable in his diaries and letters, can even be assumed, as every child in Prag in the early twentieth century 
would have known of it: “Die Kenntnis dieser Tradition von der schöpferischen Macht der Sprache darf man bei 
dem Prager Juden Kafka gewiß voraussetzen, war doch Prag die Heimat jenes legendenumwobenen Kabbalisten 
Liwa Ben Bezalel, des Hohen Rabbi Löw, von dessen Golemschöpfung jedes Prager Kind gehört hat” (161).  For an 
extensive overview of Kafka and Judaism, see Ritchie Robertson’s Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature.     
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die Welt nach der Auffassung der Kabbalisten […] also Sprache, so folgt daraus die logische 
Konsequenz, daß auch der Mensch […] an dieser sprachlich-kreativen Macht teilhat […]” (157).  
From old Jewish writings, a correlative idea to this also developed, which attributed creative 
power to all forms of verbal language.  This idea identifies the world’s origins and development, 
not just in God’s name, but in every name or in every association within the Hebrew language.  
Grözinger writes:  
Es sind [die] altjüdischen Texte […], welche eine Theologie der Gottesnamen 
entwickelten, die nicht nur jedem in der Bibel genannten Gottesnamen 
schöpferische Kräfte zusprach, sondern darüber hinaus jedem aus hebräischen 
Buchstaben zusammengesetzten Wort, ja sogar ‘sinnlosen’ Buchstabengruppen 
und schließlich jedem einzelnen Buchstaben des hebräischen Alphabetes. (154)              
In traditional Judaic language philosophy, particularly in Kabbalah, humans, as users of 
language or of the endless associations within language, can create the world.    
According to Grözinger and Kremer, the most practical and problematic implications of 
human language creation, within traditional Judaic language philosophy, can be found in the 
work of the Torah-scholar.  In Jewish theology, the Torah, strictly defined as the Jewish Written 
Law contained in the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, is also the world.  Therefore, implies 
Grözinger, as the Kabbalist studies this Law, he not only discovers the nature of the world 
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within every possible verbal association the text contains, he also participates, through this 
discovery, in the creation of God’s world:  
Beim Herstellen solcher Kombinationen [Wortverbindungen, 
Zahlwertberechnungen, Buchstabenumstellungen, u.s.w.] entdeckt der Kabbalist 
das unter der Oberfläche verborgene Wesen der Dinge, sieht Gemeinsamkeiten 
und Wesensidentitäten.  Zugleich bewirkt er damit ein entsprechendes Resultat 
in der göttlichen Welt (164).             
While readers of the Torah can create the world, it is, practically speaking, the work of the 
writer of the Torah that is most creative, and potentially problematic, within the Judaic, 
philosophical framework.  As Kremer demonstrates, writers of the Torah, defined in the strict 
sense, must be keenly aware, at all times, both of the creative power of their task and of the 
absolutely destructive potential inherent in it.  If the Torah is the Written Law that is the world, 
any mistake, or change, in the reading and writing of this Law could [negatively] transform the 
world: “Denn nur ein Wort, falsch geschrieben, kann die Welt verändern” (133).  In this way, 
the work of the writer of the Torah, or the effect of the language any Torah-scholar reads and 
writes, might easily become less the Godly creation of the world than the human 
transformation, even the ever destructive transformation of it. 
As Kremer and Grözinger also partly demonstrate, the Judaic identification of the world 
with human language, particularly with the potentially transformative and destructive work of 
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the writer of the Torah, as reader and writer of the Law, appears to have had a certain 
fundamental influence on Kafka’s life as a writer and writing method.5  Such influence is most 
readily apparent in the various language myths that appear central to the structure of many of 
Kafka’s most recognized narratives.  A scene, for example, in Kafka’s earliest extant narrative, 
“Beschreibung eines Kampfes” (1904-1907), appears to reverse the Biblical account of God’s 
creation of the world.  In the Hebrew Bible, God created the world in speaking or through 
verbal commands: “Und Gott sprach: Es sammle sich das Wasser unter dem Himmel an 
besondere Orte, dass man das Trockene sehe.  Und es geschah so” (I. Mose I.9).  In Kafka’s text, 
the first-person narrator creates, or transforms, his natural surroundings as he wishes and 
simply in speaking to it or through verbal requests: “‘Jetzt aber-ich bitte euch-Berg, Blume, 
Gras, Buschwerk und Fluß, gebt mir ein wenig Raum, damit ich atmen kann.’  Da entstand ein 
eilfertiges Verschieben in den umliegenden Bergen […]” (Nachgelassene Schriften 1:81).6  
Another scene in a short story originally included in “Beschreibung eines Kampfes,” “Gespräch 
                                                          
5 A diary entry suggests that even Kafka made the general connection between his literary work and the work of 
the Torah-scholar as a kabbalistic reader and writer of the Law.  Apparently also alluding to his own literary work, 
Kafka writes of a literature that contains the potential to be a new Kabbalah: „Diese ganze Litteratur ist Ansturm 
gegen die Grenze und sie hätte sich, wenn nicht der Zionismus dazwischen gekommen wäre, leicht zu einer neuen 
Geheimlehre, einer Kabbala entwickeln können.  Ansätze dazu bestehen.  Allerdings ein wie unbegreifliches Genie 
wird hier verlangt, das neu seine Wurzeln in die alten Jahrhunderte treibt oder die alten Jahrhunderte neu 
erschafft [...]“ (Tagebücher 878).          
6 I owe both references to Kafka’s “Beschreibung eines Kampfes,” in part, to Erich Grözinger.  He has also 
interpreted the two passages within the specific framework of traditional Judaic language philosophy, and my 
interpretation was certainly influenced by his.  Indeed, all references to Kafka and traditional Judaic philosophy in 
the thesis are colored by his and Kremer’s work.  The core research from the Hebrew Bible, and from Kafka’s 
stories, diaries, and letters, is mostly mine, however, for I have studied these works myself and quite 
independently of Grözinger and Kremer.  The passages from Kafka, which I have included in the thesis, are also 
well-known passages among Kafka scholars in general.  
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mit dem Betrunkenen,” appears to reverse traditional Judaic language philosophy’s strictest 
conception of biblical creation.  Far from creating the world out of God’s name, the narrator 
appears to transform the structures of the world through the random and highly subjective 
names he gives them.  Speaking to the heavens, and to the moon, he wonders at this 
transformative, even potentially destructive capacity in his naming: 
Warum bist du nicht mehr so übermütig, wenn ich dich nenne “Vergessene 
Papierlaterne in merkwürdiger Farbe.”  Und warum ziehst du dich fast zurück, 
wenn ich dich “Mariensäule” nenne und ich erkenne deine drohende Haltung 
nicht mehr Mariensäule, wenn ich dich nenne “Mond, der gelbes Licht wirft.”  Es 
scheint nun wirklich, daß es Euch nicht gut tut, wenn man über Euch nachdenkt; 
Ihr nehmt ab an Mut und Gesundheit. (Erzählungen 17)     
Many of Kafka’s later legal narratives, e.g., “In der Strafkolonie” (1914), appear to contain 
variations of a language myth that reverses the central Judaic image of the reader and writer of 
the Tora, or Jewish Written Law, as creator of the world.  Far from creating the natural 
structures of the world, the central characters in these stories appear to destroy legal 
structures through reading and writing the Law(s).  Kafka’s short story “Der Neue Advokat” 
(1920), for example, tells of a horse, Bucephalus, who had once carried his master, Alexander 
the Great, to the unreachable gates of India.  Alexander is now gone, and because there is 
nobody to hold the reins, to point the way to India as Alexander once did, Bucephalus appears 
12 
 
to try the next best thing, to become a lawyer and to read of Alexander and of India in the law 
books:   
Heute- das kann niemand leugnen- gibt es keinen großen Alexander [und] 
niemand, niemand kann nach Indien führen.  Schon damals waren Indiens Tore 
unerreichbar, aber ihre Richtung war durch das Königsschwert bezeichnet.  
Heute sind die Tore ganz anderswohin und weiter und höher vertragen; niemand 
zeigt die Richtung; viele halten Schwerter, aber nur, um mit ihnen zu fuchteln; 
und der Blick, der ihnen folgen will, verwirrt sich.  Vielleicht ist es deshalb 
wirklich das Beste, sich, wie es Bucephalus getan hat, in die Gesetzbücher zu 
versenken.  Frei […] liest und wendet er die Blätter unserer alten Bücher. 
[emphasis added] (Erzählungen 167)     
Though Kafka’s story ends with the possibility that Bucephalus reaches India by way of figures, 
or in reading the law books, it also hints at an alternative ending.  Far from finding India, in 
successfully submitting to Alexander’s leadership, Bucephalus’ behavior, as free reader, appears 
to lead, figuratively, to the behavior of the independent subjects.  As a free reader, Bucephalus 
would be confused in vision and flailing about uselessly, not with swords, as do the 
independent subjects, but with words.7  The successful unity of authority and subject, under 
                                                          
7 This reading is partly informed by Kafka’s repeated tendency to associate words with sharp, sword-like weaponry.  
He writes, for example: “Jedes Wort […] wird zum Spieß, gekehrt gegen den Sprecher (Tagebücher 926).    
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Alexander’s leadership, is relegated to the past under Bucephalus because the presence of 
human language breaks the Law.            
In much the same way as his fictional characters with the written Law(s), Kafka 
intimately identified his life with his literature.  In a letter to Felice Bauer, he wrote: “Ich habe 
kein litterarisches Interesse sondern bestehe aus Litteratur, ich bin nichts anderes und kann 
nichts anderes sein [...]” (Briefe 1913 261).  Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, there is 
often very little distinction between the legal relationships in Kafka’s fictional narratives and the 
personal or familial relationships of his autobiographical works.  One of Kafka’s most famous 
short stories, “Das Urteil” (1912), for example, tells of a verbal conflict as legal trial between 
father and son, culminating in the deadly judgment of the father.  The story appears to develop 
further within a lengthy letter Kafka addressed, but never gave, to his actual father, “Brief an 
den Vater” (1919).  It is largely a statement by Kafka, in which he appears to defend himself, 
exposing the powerful father of his youth.  Kafka wrote, for example: “Unverständlich war mir 
immer Deine vollständige Empfindungslosigkeit dafür, was für Leid und Schande Du mit Deinen 
Worten und Urteilen mir zufügen konntest, es war, als hättest Du keine Ahnung von Deiner 
Macht” [emphasis added] (13).8  In fact, Kafka identified with Georg Bendemann, the fictional 
son in “Das Urteil,” through verbal associations in their respective names.  He wrote, in a letter 
                                                          
8 Much like Kafka’s “Brief an den Vater,” the short story “Gespräch mit dem Beter,” also originally included in 
“Beschreibung eines Kampfes” (1904-1907), appears to reference the son in exposing the father.  It includes a 
reverse chronology of two well-known biblical events [the Tower of Babel and Ham’s rebellion from Genesis 11 
and 9] that appears to associate the confusion of human language at the Tower of Babel with the breakdown of 
the human family, particularly with Ham’s exposure of his drunk and naked father, Noah.   
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to Felice Bauer: “[...] Sieh nur die Namen! [...] Georg hat so viel Buchstaben wie Franz, 
‚Bendemann’ besteht aus Bende und Mann, Bende hat so viel Buchstaben wie Kafka und auch 
die zwei Vokale stehn an gleicher Stelle [...]” (Briefe 1913 201).  Reversing one of the central 
images of the writer of the Torah in traditional Judaic language philosophy, Kafka appears, not 
to create the world, but to break the Law through the literature he wrote, and he ultimately did 
this through verbal associations, not within God’s name, but within his name,9 or in any name 
or verbal expression.  
 
Kafka’s Method of Writing through Verbal Associations 
Kafka wrote in a diary entry: “Wenn ich wahllos einen Satz hinschreibe z.B. Er schaute 
aus dem Fenster so ist er schon vollkommen” (Tagebücher 30).  Whatever else Kafka meant by 
this, it is certainly possible to interpret it as a statement on his writing method, one in which a 
complete text develops through the writing of a random verbal expression.  Support for such an 
interpretation, and its clarification, appears to be found in the numerous studies on Kafka’s 
writing method, such as that of Oliver Jahraus in his multifaceted book Franz Kafka.  For 
Jahraus, Kafka’s ideal text develops out of itself: “Der entscheidende Wert besteht darin, dass 
die zu erzählende Geschichte sich von selbst entwickelt” (72).  The text most often used to 
demonstrate this writing style is the short story “Das Urteil” (1912), which Kafka described as 
                                                          
9 Gustav Janouch, who is most famous for his documented conversations with Kafka, also recalled, for example, a 
comment made by Kafka, in which he appears to find himself defined through Czech associations in his name: “‘Ich 
bin ein ganz unmöglicher Vogel […] ich bin eine Dohle- eine kavka’” (36).  
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his greatest success and which he wrote in a single night: “Diese Geschichte ‘Das Urteil’ habe 
ich in der Nacht vom 22 zum 23 von 10 Uhr abends bis 6 Uhr früh in einem Zug geschrieben” 
(Tagebücher 460).  A few highly renowned Kafka scholars, such as Malcolm Pasley, Clayton 
Koelb, and Stanley Corngold, have linked this writing method of Kafka with a keen eye for 
discovering the associations in language.  For these scholars, Kafka’s texts develop out of 
themselves because isolated words and verbal expressions carry within themselves vast 
networks of associations, and they have recognized a direct affinity between the fictional 
structures of Kafka’s narratives and the verbal structures that name them.  Likely beginning 
with Günther Anders (Kafka―Pro und Contra, 1951), who links key images and events in a few 
of Kafka’s narratives with a literalization of the metaphor, these scholars typically associate the 
fictional world in Kafka’s narratives with the broad spectrum of associative language.  Malcolm 
Pasley, for example, writes that Kafka’s texts are driven, to some extent, by subtle word play 
that references real people and events outside of the text, in the way that “der frühere 
Kommandant,” in Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie,” might reference Franz Kafka.  Pasley writes: 
“[Kafka geht] über Wortspiele und verdeckte Redefiguren [hinaus] und [bezieht] sich 
stillschweigend auf wirkliche Gegenstände, Personen, oder Erreignisse außerhalb des Textes” 
(68).  For Clayton Koelb, Kafka’s texts are often centered, not just in a literalization of the 
metaphor, as with Anders, but in the equal possibility of literalization and figuration in the use 
of metaphor.  Koelb writes: “Kafka draws the reader’s attention to the possibility of slippage 
between literal and figurative uses [of metaphor]” (117).  To illustrate this, Koelb refers, for 
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example, to one of Kafka’s parable-like short stories that Max Brod published posthumously 
under the title “Der Kreisel” about a philosopher who fails to understand a spinning top.  For 
Koelb, the philosopher’s failed attempt at understanding is rooted in an attempt to read the 
metaphor begreifen (“to understand”): 
The paradox of [the philosopher’s] situation, which ultimately turns his hope into 
nauseated despair, is that the act of grasping the spinning top cannot give him a 
grasp of it; begreifen (in the literal sense) positively excludes begreifen (in the 
figurative sense) because of course the act of grasping the top causes it to stop 
spinning, to become nothing more than a “silly piece of wood” of no 
philosophical interest. (118)     
Much like Koelb with Kafka’s philosophic insight, Stanley Corngold appears to locate much of 
Kafka’s legal insight, including the development of the legal structures in his fictional narratives, 
within all the tensions of metaphoric language, including historical, literal, and figurative 
tensions.  Corngold writes, for example: 
Kafka perceives that the apparent harmlessness of metaphors in common usage 
conceals the struggle of wills to make words mean one thing rather than 
another.  In organizing stories around the effort to interpret image-words and 
concept-words advantageously, in making culpability and even death the cost of 
failure in this effort, Kafka dramatizes the severity of the struggle […] The 
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imposition of meaning naturally involves force [and] this struggle rages in the 
hero: he is the arena of contesting interpetations of the metaphor […] (The 
Necessity of Form 95) 
As Stanley Corngold appears to demonstrate, Franz Kafka, a philosopher of the Law and writer 
of legal myths, was also a verbal analyst, who developed these myths out of associations in 
language. 
 
The Thesis and Method of Reading Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” 
While a few well-respected Kafka scholars, like Clayton Koelb and Stanley Corngold, 
have linked Franz Kafka with a writing method through which he developed the fictional world 
of his narratives out of associations in language, the studies or readings of these scholars are, 
for the most part, highly theoretical and not supported by extensive close reading.10  They are 
often rooted in abstract, linguistic concepts and, when practically applied to Kafka’s texts, they 
remain general in focus and are never restricted to the fullness and complexity of any specific 
text.  Stanley Corngold’s study, in Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form (1988), for example, 
begins with modern linguistic concepts and twentieth century language philosophy, e.g., the 
metaphoric nature of language,11 and ultimately ends with theories of Kafka’s writing method, 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Clayton Koelb, Kafka’s Rhetoric: The Passion of Reading, and Stanley Corngold, Franz Kafka: 
The Necessity of Form. 
11 Referencing, for example, the modern philosophies of Fritz Mauthner and Friedrich Nietzche, Corngold writes of 
the loss of Urbedeutung within the virtually infinite conjunction of man-made, historical images in any given word: 
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not so much in the practical demonstration of it.  Corngold clearly regards two of Kafka’s most 
famous short stories, “Die Verwandlung” and “Das Urteil” (1912), as unique metaphoric 
developments, particularly in the extent to which this is the case.  He writes, for example:  
“The Judgment” is all in all remarkable in Kafka’s oeuvre for the extent to which 
it is informed by metaphor.  It is about the way the metaphor of judgment is 
read, but more, it is an enactment of the stakes in the judging of metaphors as 
such […] with the result that it will make sense to see father and son as seeking 
to destroy one another by literalizing the open figure that the other is (Necessity 
of Form 97). 
However, Corngold’s study does not include full interpretations of these stories, as metaphoric 
developments.  His interpretations are based in isolated readings of a few specific metaphors or 
words, as they relate to narrow areas of these texts, such as the metaphor das Urteil 
(“judgment”), as it relates to certain aspects of the hostile relationship between Georg 
Bendemann and his father in Kafka’s “Das Urteil.”  In short, Corngold never attempts in his 
study to apply the full spectrum of associative language to a full reading of “Die Verwandlung” 
or “Das Urteil.” 
                                                          
“Words act as semiotic memorials to a history of usages held to be similar; words fold together implications made 
cognate by human wills” (Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form 93).    
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While no full reading of any of Kafka’s fictional narratives through verbal associations is 
included in the studies of scholars such as Clayton Koelb and Stanley Corngold, “In der 
Strafkolonie” appears to be one of the most neglected narratives in these studies.  Clayton 
Koelb leaves the story entirely out of his study, and while Stanley Corngold mentions the story 
briefly, he only does so in referencing the contribution of Günther Anders, who claimed that 
Kafka’s literal reading of a single figure of speech, Am eignen Leibe etwas erfahren [“To feel it 
with your own body”], was the inspiration behind the story (Corngold 50).  It is strange that 
scholars such as Koelb and Corngold have not studied Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” more 
extensively with regard to its verbal associations.  This is particularly true because among 
Kafka’s major short stories, including the two more famous contemporaries “Das Urteil” and 
“Die Verwandlung,” “In der Strafkolonie” stands alone in the centrality and extent of its 
language themes, and many scholars have approached the story in this respect, focusing their 
studies almost exclusively on the verbal images and events in the fictional story.  Indeed, 
though it is one of Kafka’s most abstract and ambiguous legal stories, “In der Strafkolonie” is 
also a language story, structured around verbal expressions and interpretations of the Old Law.  
The story is set in a penal colony, and its plot essentially consists in the legal explanations of the 
Officer of the Penal Colony to the visiting Traveler, who interprets and judges these 
explanations.  The Officer, who continues to follow the Old Commandant, presents the Old Law 
to the Traveler within the specific case of the Condemned Man.  This Old Law appears to consist 
in the sole commandment to honor superiors and in a single judgment: the certainty of guilt.  
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Those who are guilty under the Old Law are to be executed under a machine that slowly 
inscribes the commandment, written as a legal document in intricate signs by the Old 
Commandant, deep into their flesh.  The condemned men are to interpret this commandment 
as wounds on their body or as they die.  According to the Officer’s explanations, however, the 
Old Law is no longer followed under the influences of the New Commandant.  Supporters are in 
hiding, and in voicing their allegiance, they utter ambiguous expressions.  Furthermore, instead 
of one judge and a single judgment, as under the Old Commandant, the new courts, under the 
New Commandant, consist of many judges.  The Officer desires the Traveler’s verbal support 
against the New Commandant and his influences, but for the Traveler the Old Law and 
execution procedure is inhumane and unjust.  Soon after the Traveler voices his judgment to 
the Officer, the Officer frees the Condemned Man and places himself under the execution 
machine.  The story essentially ends as the Officer is killed and the machine self-destructs.               
Because the story is set in a penal colony, many scholars, such as Rainer Stach, Paul 
Peters, and Danilyn Rutherford, for example, understandably focus their studies of “In der 
Strafkolonie” in its legal imagery.  Some of these scholars approach the story literally and 
interpret its imagery within early twentieth century or modern political contexts.  Rainer Stach, 
a well-respected biographer of Kafka, reasonably traces the violent images in the story, for 
example, to WWI (557), whereas Paul Peters identifies in the story’s imagery an Urbild of the 
terrifying and senseless history of European colonialism (403).  The majority of scholars that 
interpret the story in a legal context, do so, however, allegorically and embed their studies in 
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abstract systems of twentieth century legal or philosophic thought, often hinting at Kafka’s 
mythology of the absent Law in human language.  Danilyn Rutherford, for example, approaches 
“In der Strafkolonie” from the perspective of modern legal theory and argues that the 
incomprehensibility of the Law both sustains it and brings about its own subversion.  Axel 
Hecker declares the story a post-modern, philosophical history, a “Geistesgeschichte en 
miniature” (87), and claims that the destruction of the Old Commandant’s execution machine in 
the Penal Colony signifies the deconstructive breakdown of signification in Kafka’s text, “In der 
Strafkolonie,” itself.   
Equally as many Kafka scholars base their allegorically-focused studies almost 
exclusively on the verbal images and events in the fictional story, however.  These studies are 
often embedded in abstract systems of twentieth century linguistic thought, and they point, 
more directly, to Kafka’s mythology of the absent Law in human language.  Clayton Koelb, in his 
study on Kafka’s highly equivocal reading concept, identifies the execution machine, under the 
Old Law, as a writing and reading machine and the story’s central characters as readers of 
verbal texts (69-108).  For Koelb, reading the Old Law in the Penal Colony results in both a 
violent or deadly mode of reading and an antithetical human one.  In a slightly veiled reference 
to the freed Condemned Man, under the Penal Colony’s New Law, Koelb writes, for example, of 
the legal subject, who is now an independent reader: “This other reader, freed from the 
authority of the text, becomes his own authority, a monarch unto himself” (91).  Richard T. 
Gray, in a study rooted in twentieth century deconstructive linguistic theory, identifies the 
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structure of the execution machine as a symbol for the three-fold structure of the verbal sign: 
the signified, the signifier, and the interpreter (225).  For Gray, the execution machine and its 
breakdown signifies not just operative disjunction in the sign figuratively, but also the literal 
breakdown of communication between two of its interpreters, the Officer and the Traveler in 
the Penal Colony (233).  Gray also interprets the machine and its breakdown as a figure for the 
actual instability in the story’s narrative structure itself: “[F]luctuation in perspective enacts on 
the level of narrative structure, and as a consequence in the sphere of reader-response as well, 
the problematic of successful mediation that lies at the heart of the story” (236).  In the context 
of scholarly research on “In der Stafkolonie,” Richard T. Gray’s study nicely represents the 
starting point from which this thesis begins.  Gray’s “problematic of successful mediation,” 
between two different perspectives on the level of narrative structure, takes the form, in this 
thesis, of two oppositional readings of the verbal signs in Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie”: A 
reading primarily from the perspective of the Officer under the Old Law and a reading primarily 
from the perspective of the Traveler under the New Law.   
Because Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is so uniquely centered in verbal images and 
events, and because it is one of Kafka’s most-recognized language myths, it was chosen for the 
thesis to demonstrate the profound effect of Kafka’s writing method through verbal 
associations on the development of a literary text.  To this end, the thesis will be founded in 
German lexical research.  The Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm is 
used particularly with regard to historical or etymological language associations.  With the aid 
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of the Deutsches Wörterbuch, the main body of the thesis attempts to utilize Kafka’s writing 
method as a reading method.  Through the lens of Kafka’s twentieth century language 
mythology, rooted in traditional Judaic language philosophy, this thesis seeks to develop the 
fictional world of Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” through verbal associations.  Much like the 
studies of Stanley Corngold, though applied to an entire text, it seeks to trace the broken legal 
structures of the story through the tensions of associative language.  Through this method, the 
thesis ultimately aims to re-create, for the reader as it was for the writer, a life comprised 
entirely of literature or a world that finds its origins in verbal associations.  Much like the Officer 
and the Traveler, who read the intricate signs of the Old Commandant’s legal documents, the 
reader reads the verbal associations of Franz Kafka’s literary document.  The legal procedures in 
the Penal Colony are the verbal procedures that are “In der Strafkolonie.”   
Because, for practical reasons, this thesis cannot include the entire story and all the 
verbal associations that have been discovered, it seeks to develop the central images and 
events of the narrative, beginning with the opening scene, through key associations in words 
and verbal expressions.  While some of these associations may appear exaggerated, this is 
partly because the thesis seeks to utilize a writing method that looks to any and all possible 
associations for inspiration.  In much the same way, while many of the associations may not be 
evident at first glance to a modern reader, it is in reading the Old Law of the Penal Colony that 
historical and antiquated associations are often most relevant.  Following the legal transition of 
the Penal Colony in the narrative, particularly as it is described by the Officer to the Traveler, 
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the images and events of the Old Law (Chaper 1) are presented separately from those of the 















Chapter I: In the Penal Colony, under the Old Law 
“Modern man sees his relationship downward to the animal and to the machine”-Francis A. Schaeffer12  
“Ein erstes Zeichen beginnender Erkenntnis ist der Wunsch zu sterben”-Franz Kafka13      
 
Much of Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie”14 is devoted to a machine.  Not only is it the 
central instrument in the Penal Colony’s legal procedure under the Old Commandant, it is also 
the main, and at times, only character in the story: the Officer’s detailed explanations of the 
machine form the focal point of his presentation of the Penal Colony’s legal procedure to the 
visiting Traveler and almost fully occupy the first half of the text.  From the very beginning, the 
Officer’s verbal explanations both underline and mimic, in this way, not only the mechanically 
inhumane nature of the Penal Colony’s legal procedure, but also its strongly verbal quality: the 
legal machine of the Penal Colony is an execution machine that is also a verbal construct; the 
legal procedure is a verbal process, that not only figuratively seeks to eliminate all characters 
from the Officer’s explanations, but it literally engraves its written laws into human bodies.  The 
legal procedure in the Penal Colony under the Old Law, embodied in the Officer’s overwhelming 
                                                          
12 Escape from Reason (26).  
13 Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente (2: 116). 
14 The primary text used for the thesis and from which quotes are taken directly is in the original German and 
found in the Kafka compilation Drucke zu Lebzeiten, compiled and edited by the widely-renowned Kafka scholars 
Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch, and Gerhard Neumann.  Henceforth, I will be referring to this actual text as “In der 
Strafkolonie” and to the fictional images and events in the story as in the Penal Colony. 
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verbal explanations of the Old Commandant’s inhumane writing machine, seems to develop out 
of the figurative expression, “Nach dem Buchstaben des Gesetzes” (“to the letter of the law”). 
  
 I.1.The Law as a Machine 
The Old Law of the Penal Colony is a machine that is also a verbal construct, one that 
seeks to eliminate all other characters in the story or anything that might deviate from the 
Officer’s explanations of the machine.  Evidence of this can be found at the outset of the 
Officer’s explanations in the beginning of the story, when the Traveler makes comments, not 
directed to the machine, but to the uniforms that he and the Officer are wearing.  The Officer 
appears to understand these comments as nothing more than useless digression: “‘Diese 
Uniformen sind doch für die Tropen zu schwer,’ sagte der Reisende, statt sich, wie es der 
Offizier erwartet hatte, nach dem Apparat zu erkundigen.  ‘Gewiss,’ sagte der Offizier […], ‘aber 
sie bedeuten die Heimat; wir wollen nicht die Heimat verlieren. – Nun sehen Sie aber diesen 
Apparat,’ […]” [emphasis added] (204).  The Officer directs the Traveler’s attention to his 
explanations of the machine and away from the cause of distraction, something he continues to 
do throughout much of the text, especially with regard to the Condemned Man and his case.  
When the Traveler finally manages to gain an explanation from the Officer concerning the 
Condemned Man’s case, or the legal procedure behind the operation of the machine, the 
Officer seems hurried in finishing it, forcing the focus back to the machine: “‘Ist nun alles 
erklärt?  Aber die Zeit vergeht […], und ich bin mit der Erklärung des Apparates noch nicht 
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fertig.’  Er nötigte den Reisenden auf den Sessel nieder, trat wieder zu dem Apparat und begann 
[…]” (213).  As the Officer directs the Traveler’s attention away from the Condemned Man and 
to his verbal explanations of the machine, he has gestured, not just to the machine itself, but to 
the inhumane verbal construct that defines it.  From the outset of the story in this way, the 
Officer’s verbal explanations to the Traveler can be associated with Kafka’s literary text to the 
reader.  The machine, including all the legal structures and procedures in the Penal Colony, as 
they are later explained by the Officer, might ultimately be understood, not only as a verbal 
construct in the fictional sense, but as the actual verbal construct of the story.  Much like the 
Traveler, who listens to the Officer’s explanations and observes the machine in the Penal 
Colony, the reader reads word associations that are “In der Strafkolonie.”  These associations 
begin in depicting the law as a machine.          
  When, in the opening line of the text, the Officer refers to the machine, saying: “Es ist 
ein eigentümlicher Apparat” [emphasis added] (203), he seems to have verbally drawn 
attention, not just to a machine, but to a type of legal system or to a system that is 
fundamentally human.  The term Apparat can be used, for instance, in an administrative or 
political context: “ein Verwaltungsapparat/ein politischer Apparat,” and it might also refer to a 
living, organ system, as in the compound noun “Herz-Kreislauf-Apparat.”  Much like in the 
Officer’s explanations of the law to the Traveler, such tension in the term Apparat might allow a 




Perhaps the clearest, and most direct, evidence of such a reading can be found in a 
change in the word that refers to the machine in the text.  In the first third of the story, it is 
termed solely an Apparat.  After the machine had been fully described by the Officer, and while 
he begins to demonstrate its operation, the text transitions to the more clearly mechanical 
term Maschine in referring to it: “Der Reisende hatte das Ohr zum Offizier geneigt und sah, die 
Hände in den Rocktaschen, der Arbeit der Maschine zu” [emphasis added] (220).  The text’s 
transition from Apparat to Maschine, in naming the Penal Colony’s central legal agency under 
the Old Law, appears to depict an inhumane legal transition that is also a verbal transformation 
or a shift in the reading of words.  The Old Law of the Penal Colony is a machine in the verbal 
sense, and its structure, or connected parts, can also be observed in word associations. 
 
I.2.The Structure of the Machine             
The structure of the Penal Colony’s machine, as the Officer presents it, is a large, tri-
partite one, consisting of the Bett [bed], the Egge [harrow], and the Zeichner [drafter] (206).15  
All three parts, though individually named and structurally distinct, are also connected in 
multiple ways.  The bed, upon which the Condemned Man lies, strapped down and naked, is 
the lowest part of the structure.  It is covered with a cotton material, that rolls and rotates the 
body of the Condemned Man, and it is of the same size and chest-like shape as the upper 
                                                          
15 The term der Zeichner, like the drafter, typically refers to a type of human.  Kafka’s text appears to reverse this 
association, as it refers here to a part of a machine.     
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drafter, to which it is connected with brass rods.  Like the drafter, the bed also has its own 
individual battery, in large part for controlling its quivering movements that coordinate with 
those of the harrow.  The harrow, which actually writes or engraves the law or legal text into 
the entire body of the Condemned Man, is made out of glass and has many needles.  It is 
suspended between the bed and the drafter, to which it is connected by a steel band.  The 
drafter, which contains the legal documents of the Old Commandant and is ultimately 
responsible for controlling the violent work of the harrow, appears to be the most impressive 
mechanical structure of all the parts of the machine.  It is an extremely large and complex gear 
or wheel mechanism.  Perhaps for this reason, among others, it is anointed, in words and 
gesture, the most important part of the machine by the Officer in his explanations to the 
Traveler: “‘Nun weiß ich schon alles,’ sagte der Reisende, als der Offizier wieder zu ihm 
zurückkehrte.  ‘Bis auf das Wichtigste,’ sagte dieser, ergriff den Reisenden am Arm und zeigte in 
die Höhe: ‘Dort im Zeichner ist das Räderwerk […]’” [emphasis added] (217).   
The importance of the drafter’s wheel mechanism, as indicated by the Officer in his 
explanations to the Traveler, allows the wheel to nicely exemplify how the structure of the 
Penal Colony’s legal machine might develop through verbal associations.  And indeed, the 
numerous legal terms that can be associated with Rad actually seem to mirror the many 
connected “gears” or “wheels” of the drafter’s wheel mechanism.  For instance, one term that 
is closely related to Rad (wheel), and that is also scattered in various forms throughout the text, 
is Kreis (circle).  It is a term that can be used figuratively in referring to social or political groups: 
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“ein politischer Kreis.”  Thus, the circular formation of followers around the machine, during its 
procedure in the old days, appears to develop out of the literal reading of a metaphor that 
might refer to the followers as a group, der Gesellschaftskreis: “die Gesellschaft-kein hoher 
Beamte durfte fehlen-ordnete sich um die Maschine” (225).16  If the followers of the Old Law 
are a Kreis, in the verbal sense, they might also be a Rad: a circle is the form of a wheel.  
Through the semantic chain Gesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad, the followers of the Old Law do not 
just make the machine the center of their attention, nor does their behavior simply imitate 
forms in the machine’s drafter.  They are the forms that make up the drafter.  Just as the Officer 
attempts to do with the Traveler through his explanations, verbal connections within Kafka’s 
text, such as Gesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad, might inform the reader of the range of ideas of the 
Old Commandant, “seinen Gedankenkreis,”17 specifically as they relate to the parts that make 
up the drafter.  Just as the Old Commandant’s ideas dictated the building of a legal machine 
with many gears or wheels,18 so too might verbal associations, such as Gedankenkreis-
Gesellschaftskreis-Kreis-Rad.   
                                                          
16 Under the New Law, as the Officer anticipates it, this practice is also to be expected.  The ladies of the New 
Commandant will sit in a circle, as the Traveler’s judgment concerning the Old Law is questioned, a gesture that 
might also mimic a metaphor that could refer to the “meeting” or “session” in which this will take place (eine 
Sitzung): ”Und seine Damen werden im Kreis herumsitzen” [emphasis added] (229).              
17 The Officer uses this phrase when referring, in the theoretical words of the New Commandant, to the Traveler’s 
unfamiliarity with the Old Commandant and his thought patterns upon his arrival in the Penal Colony: “Sie kannten 
den alten Kommandanten und seinen Gedankenkreis nicht” (228).  The Officer, it appears, intends to remedy this 
problem by informing the Traveler of these thought patterns.    
18 “Dieser Apparat […] ist eine Erfindung unseres früheren Kommandanten” (205). 
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The connection between the Old Commandant and the mechanical parts of the drafter 
can perhaps be traced, more directly, through etymological connections within the term Rad.  
In Middle High German, it appeared in the form rat (Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm 
und Wilhelm Grimm volume 14, column 35)19 and could be associated, for this reason, with the 
term Rat,20 a noun that can historically refer, among other things, to various types of authority 
figures.  It is, in a strict sense, an instruction or a directive to be followed: “im schärfsten sinne 
die anweisung, der man zu folgen hat” (DW 14, 161).21  Read through the association Rat-Rad, 
one that might originate in the historical, morphological transition rat-Rad, the Old 
Commandant and his legal directives are the wheels or moving parts of the machine that is the 
Old Law of the Penal Colony.  This Law, as a machine, a symbol easily associated with efficiency 
and power, combines all such directives, into one inhumane principle.         
 
                                                          
19 Henceforth, all references to Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm will be given as 
follows (DW x,y) with ‘x’ referring to the respective volume and ‘y’ referring to the respective column in that 
volume.   
20 In New High German, Rad is also often phonetically indistinguishable from Rat.  Perhaps Kafka, aware of the 
phonetic similarity of Rad and Rat, allowed the associated meanings of each word to coalesce and intermingle.    
21 Originally referring to the physical care from authorities to their subjects, the term Rat became associated with 
the care from authority figures through their instructions or directives: “rat war die fürsorge des 
geschlechtsoberhauptes durch anweisung und belehrung seiner geschlechtsgenossen.”  Within this context, the 
term Rat ultimately began to refer to the directives of authority figures themselves and only by extension to the 
milder “proposal” or “suggestion” (DW 14, 161).     
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I.3.One Principle: the Certainty of Guilt 
The law or legal proceedings behind the machine and the specific case of the 
Condemned Man are finally, if only briefly, explained by the Officer in response to the 
Traveler’s insistent questioning.  These proceedings are, however, much like the operation of 
an efficient and powerful machine.  The Officer, who is now the sole judge in the Penal Colony 
because the Old Commandant has died, does not allow legal defense, and he makes judgments 
according to one principle, that guilt is always certain.  He says to the Traveler: “Der Grundsatz, 
nachdem ich entscheide, ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” (212).  The Officer’s principle of 
judgment can be seen as the development of a certain semantic combination within the term 
Schuld.  It can refer, not just to a “[legal] guilt,” but to a “[moral] guilt” or to “sin”: “[Schuld] 
steht gern in verbindung mit sünde” (DW 15, 879).22  If legal guilt is also sin, then it might be 
original sin (Erbsünde) and, by definition, always certain.23  The case of the Condemned Man, 
which consists in an unavoidable act of guilt and in the Officer’s immediate declaration of guilt, 
seems to turn this verbal possibility into a legal principle.         
 
                                                          
22 The term Schuld originally referred to a favor and to the associated debt, in both the monetary and general 
sense.  It is within this context that it became associated, in the reverse, with an offense or a crime that demanded 
vengeance or retribution: “ein begangenes unrecht, das wieder gut gemacht, gesühnt werden musz” (DW 15, 
879).        
23 The connection “sin”-“original sin” would have been one easily made by the Jewish Kafka in early twentieth 
century Prague, writing in a German language, strongly rooted in the Western tradition and in Judeo-Christianity. 
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I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case    
The Officer quickly explains the case of the Condemned Man to the Traveler, shortly 
after declaring his principle of judgment.  According to the Officer, this case is as simple as all 
other cases: “er ist so einfach, wie alle” (212):   
Ein Hauptmann hat heute morgens die Anzeige erstattet, daβ dieser Mann, der 
ihm als Diener zugeteilt ist und vor seiner Türe schläft, den Dienst verschlafen 
hat.  Er hat nämlich die Pflicht, bei jedem Stundenschlag aufzustehen und vor der 
Tür des Hauptmanns zu salutieren.  Gewiβ keine schwere Pflicht und eine 
notwendige, denn er soll sowohl zur Bewachung als auch zur Bedienung frisch 
bleiben.  Der Hauptmann wollte in der gestrigen Nacht nachsehen, ob der Diener 
seine Pflicht erfülle.  Er öffnete Schlag zwei Uhr die Tür und fand ihn 
zusammengekrümmt schlafen.  Er holte die Reitpeitsche und schlug ihm über das 
Gesicht.  Statt nun aufzustehen und um Verzeihung zu bitten, faβte der Mann 
seinen Herrn bei den Beinen, schüttelte ihn und rief: “Wirf die Peitsche weg, 
oder ich fresse dich.”- Das ist der Sachverhalt.  Der Hauptmann kam vor einer 
Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf und anschließend gleich das Urteil.  
Dann ließ ich dem Mann die Ketten anlegen. (212-213) 
Both the development of the Condemned Man’s case and the Officer’s judgment concerning it 
can be demonstrated as the product of a verbal process or reasoning.  Both seem to originate, 
not out of something within the case itself, but out of the language of the Officer’s guiding 
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principle.  The overall sense is that this “simple case,” or the Condemned Man’s unavoidable 
guilt and the Officer’s immediate judgment, flow out of a merging of associations or meanings 
within the term Schuld.  For example, historically the noun Schuld does not only refer to “guilt” 
but can also be associated with Pflicht,24 the word that is used by the Officer in referring to the 
duty of the Condemned Man.  The Condemned Man’s guilt in attempting to fulfill his duty 
might be certain because the word Schuld means both “duty” and “guilt.”  This juxtaposition in 
the word Schuld appears, at least partly, to explain the absurdly difficult responsibility and 
failure of the Condemned Man to wake and salute on the hour, every hour during the night.  
Regarding the Officer’s judgment of this case, the correlation between an accusation and a 
declaration of guilt might be found in the Old German morphological association between the 
two terms Anschuldigung and Schuld: a written accusation is a “schriftliche schult” (DW 15, 
1884).25  A semantic equivalency between the two terms Anschuldigung and Schuld might be 
derived from a historical, morphological one: Anschuldigung means Schuld because, in the past, 
it might have appeared that way (schult).  Much like a rigorous application of this verbal 
principle to the term Schuld, the Officer accepts, without hesitation, the account of the captain 
against the Condemned Man as a statement of his guilt, and he immediately writes his 
sentence.  
                                                          
24 At its origin, the term Schuld first denoted a duty or a service to which one is bound: “was man soll oder schuldig 
ist, eine verpflichtung oder eine leistung, wozu man verbunden ist” (DW 15, 1871).            
25 In DW 15, 1884, this is illustrated by referencing the following quote from Spittendorf: “so solten schriftliche 
schult und antwort gegen einander gehen” (67).  
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Though perhaps ultimately a further development of the Officer’s principle of judgment, 
read through associations in the term Schuld,26 the simplicity and specific details of the Officer’s 
sentence in the case of the Condemned Man seem to develop, most directly, out of figurative 
associations in the captain’s actual account of the crime.  The verbal nature of the punishment 
fitting the crime, in this “simple” case, seems hinted at in the Officer’s statement regarding his 
sentencing: “Der Hauptmann kam vor einer Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf und 
anschließend gleich das Urteil” [emphasis added] (213).  Due to a certain double-meaning in the 
term gleich, the Officer did not just write the judgment or sentence of the Condemned Man 
“immediately” upon writing down the account of the captain, he also wrote both exactly the 
same way or “identically.”  And indeed, there seems to be a certain verbal equivalency between 
the account of the captain, regarding the Condemned Man’s crime, and the Officer’s judgment 
or sentencing of him.  For example, historically and figuratively, “to fall asleep” or “to sleep” 
carries the sense of “to die” or “to be dead.”  Historically, the verb entschlafen literally means 
“einschlafen,” yet figuratively it is synonymous with “sterben” (DW 3, 601).  In a similar way, 
the figurative phrase den letzten Schlaf tun means “tot sein.”  Furthermore, because the noun 
Schlag can historically refer, not only to a violent “strike,” but also to a “wunde” or a “wound” 
(DW 15, 316),27 the implicit prepositional phrase that indicates when the Condemned Man falls 
                                                          
26 Within the western, Judeo-Christian language framework, for example, Schuld is easily associated with a type of 
death sentence: “Denn der Tod ist der Sünde Sold” (Römer 6.23). 
27 In Middle High German and in early New High German the word Schlag often carried a stronger meaning than it 
does currently in New High German.  It could refer not only to a “wound,” but to a “deadly wound” or to a deadly 
wounding procedure, particularly with regard to animals: “das schlachten” (DW 15, 316).   
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asleep or sleeps, “at the turn of the hour” (beim Stundenschlag), could also be interpreted as 
with an hourly wound.  Therefore, an implicit verbal form of the Condemned Man’s alleged 
crime of falling asleep or sleeping at the turn of the hour, Er schläft beim Stundenschlag [ein], 
also names and seems to determine the form of his punishment.28  Not only does he lie on the 
ground, whipped in the face, but he will die [on a bed] with an hourly wound: “Die ersten sechs 
Stunden lebt der Verurteilte fast wie früher, er leidet nur Schmerzen […] Wie still wird dann 
aber der Mann um die sechste Stunde!” (219).29  According to a certain reading [and writing] of 
this case, the Condemned Man’s crime warrants an immediate, and rather specific, death 
sentence.  Like all men under the Old Law, however, the Condemned Man will die under the 
verbal process that defines the execution procedure of the Penal Colony.  
 
I.5.The Law as an Execution 
The Penal Colony’s execution procedure appears to develop, not only in the context of 
one specific case, but also as a consequence of the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s overall 
interpretation of the law.  In the same way, the Old Law of the Penal Colony might be 
embodied, not just in a machine, but in an execution machine because a reading of legal terms 
dictates such an embodiment.  For instance, the word Exekution, used by the narrator in the 
                                                          
28 The Condemned Man is found sleeping at exactly 2:00 a.m. (“Schlag zwei Uhr”), even though he is supposed to 
stand and salute every hour, on the hour (“bei jedem Stundenschlag”).  The Officer says: “[Der Hauptmann] 
öffnete Schlag zwei Uhr die Tür und fand ihn zusammengekrümmt schlafen” (213). 
29 The execution procedure, as the Officer fully describes it, is a twelve-hour procedure.  The sixth-hour is the 
turning point, in which the Condemned Man apparently begins to die. 
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beginning of the story to signify the machine’s deadly function, a procedure which the French 
speaking Officer will later present to the cultured Traveler (203), is derived from the Latin 
ex(s)ecutio.  Historically, or in French, it does not necessarily imply a “Hinrichtung” or a 
“[deadly] execution.”  It might simply denote the “Ausführung einer Anordnung” or the actual 
“execution [of the law]” by an executive power (Duden: Das Herkunftswörterbuch).30  This 
tension in the term Exekution, particularly through the literal German, allows the reader of it to 
equate executive administration with a deadly execution.  Because of such readings of legal 
terms, the Old Law, in every legal case, appears to manifest itself in the form of an execution or 
in an execution procedure.      
 
I.6.The Execution Procedure 
The language Kafka uses in “In der Strafkolonie” actually appears to mimic or to 
anticipate the execution procedure of the Penal Colony, as it is most thoroughly described by 
the Officer to the Traveler, soon after presenting to him the case of the Condemned Man.  One 
example can be found where the Officer explains the machine’s initial, preparatory operation, 
immediately before the procedure begins.  He says: “[I]st die Einstellung vollzogen, strafft sich 
sofort dieses Stahlseil zu einer Stange.  Und nun beginnt das Spiel” [emphasis added] (214).  It 
is not just the Officer, it seems, who describes the tightening of the machine’s parts before the 
                                                          
30 This reading is also indirectly possible through modern German.  The term Die Exekutive refers to “the executive 
authority [in government],” whereas the word that signifies the function of this authority, die Exekution, typically 
refers to “[deadly] execution.”     
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execution of the Condemned Man.  The passage itself appears to perform the machine’s 
operation for the reader.  The constant repetition of the /sch/ and /s/ phonemes, if seemingly 
playful and free, in connection with Spiel, actually seems to highlight the passage’s forcefully 
connected and tightening verbal parts, especially with regard to the firmness of the /t/ and /p/ 
phonemes that directly follow in strafft, Stahlseil, Stange, and Spiel.  Furthermore, the 
connection between this preparatory operation, verbally set in motion by straffen, and the 
ultimate function of the execution machine can be accomplished through word association, 
namely in the verbs straffen (“to tighten”) and strafen (“to discipline” or “punish”).  In the same 
way verbally, the tightening of the machine’s parts prepares the way for the punishment of the 
Condemned Man.   
Another place in the text where Kafka’s word choice appears to mimic or to anticipate 
the execution procedure of the Penal Colony is found where the Officer further describes the 
punishment of the Condemned Man in the violent functioning of the machine’s harrow.  The 
Officer says: “Zitternd sticht sie ihre Spitzen in den Körper ein […]” [emphasis added] (215).  The 
connection between the sharp needles of the harrow, that pierce and then penetrate into the 
body of the Condemned Man, and authority figures, like the Old Commandant and Officer of 
the Penal Colony, can be traced through the word Spitzen, meaning “spikes” but also referring 
to society’s “elite” or to “the heads of government.”  The phonetics of the passage can also be 
associated with the movements of the machine, as the Officer describes them.  The repetitive 
/z/, /s/, and /sch/ phonemes literally run “into the body” or “in den Körper” (“Zitternd sticht sie 
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ihre Spitzen in den Körper ein”).  In this way, the passage appears to anticipate the experiences 
of the Condemned Man, both visually and phonetically, in that the reader reads and hears what 
the Condemned Man will feel.  Much like the Old Law of the Penal Colony, both passages 
appear to convert the legal functions of authority into an execution procedure that punishes 
with spikes, quivering repetitively as they stab the body.  Most importantly, this Old Law or 
execution procedure appears to develop, in the case of the reader of “In der Strafkolonie,” out 
of a verbal text.  In the same way in the Penal Colony, it ultimately originates in the legal 
documents of the Old Commandant.  
  
I.7.The Precious Legal Documents of the Old Commandant 
The Old Law of the Penal Colony, as the Officer explains to the Traveler, is preserved in 
the form of the Old Commandant’s legal documents.  There are, however, clear hints in the 
narrative that these contain more than simple laws or legal explanations.  The Officer, for 
example, handles them like a sacred relic: they are not to be touched by anyone, and they are 
his most valuable possession.  The Officer says to the Traveler: “[I]ch kann sie Ihnen aber leider 
nicht in die Hand geben, sie sind das Teuerste, was ich habe” (217).  Most tellingly perhaps, the 
documents do not appear to contain a text in the traditional and written sense.  The narrator 
describes the appearance of one of them as the Traveler unsuccessfully attempts to decipher it: 
“Der Reisende hätte gern etwas Anerkennendes gesagt, aber er sah nur labyrinthartige, 
einander vielfachkreuzende Linien, die so dicht das Papier bedeckten, daß man nur mit Mühe 
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die weißen Zwischenräume erkannte” (217).  Its abstract image is clearly made up of lines, and 
yet it is not linear, one that would seemingly allow it to be interpreted in different ways.  Beate 
Müller, for example, demonstrates one such possibility in her essay “Die Grausame Schrift.”  
She differentiates in the legal documents of the Old Commandant both a written text and a 
work of visual art: “[…] [sie gehören] gleich zwei Gattungen an–nämlich Text und Graphik” 
(117), and she further identifies the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s reading of the law with the 
artistic quality of the document’s image.  Indeed, this connection is already hinted at in the 
narrative, when the Officer refers to the documents with a term that denotes a type of 
drawing: “Ich verwende noch die Zeichnungen des früheren Kommandanten” [emphasis added] 
(217). 
 The indecipherable complexity of the Old Commandant’s legal documents might 
originate in an attempt to associate different, possibly conflicting, meanings within the term 
Zeichnung(en), used to name and describe them.  Morphologically, the word Zeichnung can be 
associated with a more general term for symbol that can also refer to a verbal sign, Zeichen, 
and semantically, the two are indeed related.  The verb form zeichnen, for example, can 
historically signify, among other related concepts, both the writing of a verbal text and the 
creation of an artistic drawing: 
[M]it wort oder schriftlicher darstellung dinge, zustände, menschen, charaktere 
beschreiben, schildern, etwas darlegen, auseinandersetzen: scribere [und] im 
speciellen sinne zeichnen, d. h. linien und umrisse nach einem sichtbaren oder 
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vorgestellten vorbilde auf papier oder eine andere unterlage bringen, so dasz ein 
abbild entsteht. (DW 31, 492)  
When approaching the text in this way, verbal associations in the term Zeichnung seem to 
mirror the combination of the linear and figurative in the image of the documents and, at the 
same time, explain the Officer’s otherwise absurd expectation that the Traveler read one of 
them, as a clear text, although it appears to be an indecipherable work of art: “‘Lesen Sie,’ sagte 
der Offizier.  ‘Ich kann nicht,’ sagte der Reisende.  ‘Es ist doch deutlich,’ sagte der Offizier.  ‘Es 
ist sehr kunstvoll,’ sagte der Reisende ausweichend, ‘aber ich kann es nicht entziffern’” (217).   
The transition from an artistic drawing to a sacred text in the image of the documents 
can be located, not only in their abstract complexity, but also, for example, in the word that 
signifies the Old Commandant or their “drawer,” der Zeichner.  It can be understood as a 
reference to a type of godly figure.  Just as the Old Law is rooted in the past, the word, if read 
etymologically, can correspond to the more modern “Wundertäter” or “miracle-worker,” the 
creator of signs and wonders (“zeichenære,” DW 31, 494).31  It is perhaps for this reason that 
the Traveler assigns a type of godly perfection to the Old Commandant, immediately after 
hearing that he is the creator of the artistic drawings: “‘Hat er denn alles in sich vereinigt? War 
                                                          
31 The verb form zeichnen can also refer to the miraculous actions of a godly figure: ein zeichen geben, a) von 
göttlicher, überirdischer einwirkung, wunder thun.”  It does this, while carrying the overall sense of expressing in 
signs or making known with signs (DW 31, 488).  In the more specific sense of “to mark with a sign,“ the term 
zeichnen can also mean, however, “to mark [someone] with a sign“ (DW 31, 492).  This latter reading might partly 
explain why the drawings of the Old Commandant ultimately become marks on the skin of the Condemned Man.  
See also Section I.10.Deciphering the Documents as Wounds (pg.47).       
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er Soldat, Richter, Konstrukteur, Chemiker, Zeichner?’” [emphasis added] (211).  The Traveler’s 
expressed reverence for the Old Commandant, much like the Officer’s sacred handling of his 
drawings, can be, it seems, partly explained due to this reading of one of the terms that names 
or describes him, der Zeichner.32    
In fact, several of the Officer’s references to the documents themselves, or to their 
content, appear to identify them as types of scripture.  When the Officer refers to the legal 
document or law that is to be written onto the body of the Condemned Man, he says: “Dem 
Verurteilten wird das Gebot, das er übertreten hat, mit der Egge auf den Leib geschrieben,” 
[emphasis added] (210).  The law, as Gebot, may recall, for example, the biblical zehn Gebote or 
the Ten Commandments.  Indeed, though in a strangely literal and combinatory sense, the 
actual law that is to be written on the Condemned Man’s body, “Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten” 
(210), seems to reference the First and Fifth Commandments, “Du sollst keine anderen Götter 
neben mir haben” (2.Mose 20.3) and “Du sollst deinen Vater […] ehren […] (2.Mose 20.12).   
Another term that is often used in “In der Strafkolonie” when referring to the 
documents is Schrift.  The Officer seems to use it in referencing both the document’s form and 
content.  He says to the Traveler, concerning it: “Es darf natürlich keine einfache Schrift sein 
[…]” [emphasis added] (217).  The word Schrift can refer to empirical writings and scientific 
texts (“sämtliche Schriften Kants”), even to the most simple of manuscripts (“eine 
                                                          
32Beate Müller traces this development, in a similar way, through the noun Schöpfer, referring to both an “artist” 
and to “God” (117).   
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Handschrift”).  Yet, it can also refer to holy documents and religious writings: “die Heilige 
Schrift.”33  For the reader, as well as the Officer, it is only natural that this document must not 
be simple; the meaning of its name alone makes it this way.    
 
I.8.Reading the Documents and Knowing Justice with Closed Eyes    
The cause of the Traveler’s inability to read the law or legal document that the Officer 
presents to him can ultimately be understood, therefore, as a false approach in deciphering a 
sacred scrip[ture].  The Officer, for example, expects the Traveler to read the document or to 
see it with his eyes, and he presents it to him from a reasonable distance, in this regard.  He 
says to the Traveler: “[…] ich zeige sie Ihnen aus dieser Entfernung, dann werden Sie alles gut 
sehen können” [emphasis added] (217).  The implication is that the Officer is going to hold the 
document up to the Traveler, close enough that he can see it clearly, for he had just told the 
Traveler that he cannot be allowed to touch it because it is too valuable.  This fact, however, 
coupled with an unavoidable ambiguity in the passage, namely through the phrase “aus dieser 
Entfernung [zeigen],” allows it to be read in another sense, one that is inconsistent with the 
Officer’s approach in regards the Traveler: distance is required to preserve the document, and 
perhaps also for seeing it clearly.  This juxtaposition in the Officer’s statement may be 
explained, among other ways, through an ambiguity in the verb sehen, meaning both “to see” 
                                                          
33 Such a connection can also be traced through words that, though they are not explicitly mentioned in “In der 
Strafkolonie,” clearly loom large in the text, such as das Wort, meaning simply “word” or “the Word” (“das Wort 
Gottes”).   
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and “to understand.”34  This possibility may be actualized in the verb’s associative movement 
from simple physical impressions, contained in the phrase “mit den Augen sehen,” to greater 
scientific perception and understanding, shown in figurative associations with verbs such as 
wissen, erkennen, beurteilen (“Man muß die Dinge im Zusammenhang sehen”).  And yet, it can 
also refer to the spiritual insight of a Seher or Hellseher, a “seer, prophet, visionary.”  The 
Traveler might not be able to see the document better from a distance, and certainly not from a 
great distance, but he would, according to this latter reading, understand it better.  For this 
reason, a verbal conflict in the verb sehen might dictate that the Traveler cannot decipher the 
legal document of the Old Commandant because, under the Old Law of the Penal Colony, legal 
documents are not seen [with the eyes]; they are understood, meditatively and with closed 
eyes.  This can be demonstrated, perhaps most clearly, in the Officer’s description of the old 
days of the Penal Colony, when the execution procedure was still strongly supported or 
followed:   
Wie war die Exekution anders in früherer Zeit!  Schon einen Tag vor der 
Hinrichtung war das ganze Tal von Menschen überfüllt; alle kamen nur um zu 
sehen […] Vor hunderten Augen- alle Zuschauer standen auf den Fußspitzen bis 
dort zu den Anhöhen-wurde der Verurteilte vom Kommandanten selbst unter 
                                                          
34 Kafka’s text also appears to play with different modes of physical sight.  The Officer may hold the document up 
to the Traveler from a distance, so that the Traveler does not lose sight of the entire document in the details.  Such 
an analysis goes beyond the language scope of the thesis, however, and into other twentieth  century discourse.      
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die Egge gelegt […] Und nun begann die Exekution!  Kein Mißton störte die 
Arbeit der Maschine.  Manche sahen nun gar nicht mehr zu, sondern lagen mit 
geschlossenen Augen im Sand; alle wußten: Jetzt geschieht Gerechtigkeit. (225-
226) 
Many of the attendees at the execution, although seemingly coming just “to see” (“alle kamen 
nur um zu sehen”) or “to watch,” ultimately came only “to understand” in another sense.  They 
lay down on their faces, and with closed eyes, they not only understood but knew that justice 
was administered.  Under the Old Law, as in the old days of the Penal Colony, followers 
decipher legal documents and know justice with closed eyes or through a meditative ritual that 
appears literalized in the Condemned Man’s deadly judgment.               
 
  I.9.The Undeclared Judgment of the Condemned Man 
Although contained in the legal documents of the Old Commandant, the Condemned 
Man’s actual judgment is not embodied in a verbal text, nor is the Condemned Man to be 
verbally informed of it in any way.  His judgment is an undeclared judgment that he will feel on 
his body.  This is perhaps most clearly depicted in the scene where the Condemned Man 
illegally attempts to inform himself of the execution procedure during the Officer’s 
explanations to the Traveler.  The Soldier, who is charged with watching the Condemned Man 
during the explanations, becomes sleepy and inattentive, upon which the Condemned Man 
moves closer to the machine and attempts, like the Officer and Traveler, to observe the harrow: 
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“[Der Verurteilte] hatte den verschlafenen Soldaten an der Kette ein wenig vorgezerrt und sich 
auch über das Glas [der Egge] gebeugt.  Man sah, wie er mit unsicheren Augen auch das suchte, 
was die zwei Herren eben beobachtet hatten” (216).  The Officer, in turn, alerts the Soldier by 
throwing a clod of soil at him, and in response the Soldier, upon realizing what has happened, 
digs his heels into the ground and violently pulls the Condemned Man back: “[Er] stemmte die 
Füße mit den Absätzen in den Boden, riß den Verurteilten zurück, daß er gleich niederfiel, und 
sah dann auf ihn hinunter, wie er sich wand und mit seinen Ketten klirrte” [emphasis added] 
(216).  In alerting the Soldier to prevent the Condemned Man from informing himself in any 
way, the Officer’s actions remind the reader of his earlier declaration regarding the uselessness 
of verbally informing the Condemned Man of his judgment prior to the execution.  The Officer 
says, in a French tongue that the Condemned Man cannot understand: “es wäre nutzlos, es ihm 
zu verkünden.  Er erfährt es ja auf seinem Leib” (211).  Most importantly, the expressions used 
to describe the Soldier, as he prepares to pull the Condemned Man back, actually appear to 
mimic, and in some ways to determine, the events of the narrative.  It would be useless to 
inform the Condemned Man of his judgment, not simply because such a judgment cannot be 
apprehended verbally or because the Condemned Man would not understand the Officer’s 
French and responds better to physical force, but also, it seems, due to a reading of the words 
in this scene.  The noun Füße refers to anatomical “feet” but perhaps also to “metric feet” in 
poetry (Versfüße).  In a similar way, the noun Absätze can be read as human “heels” but also as 
“paragraphs” in a written work.  According to these readings, as the Soldier presses his feet and 
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heels into the ground, he transforms the medium of language into an instrument of corporeal 
punishment.        
 
I.10.Deciphering the Documents as Wounds 
The Old Law and legal documents of the Old Commandant are understood, not simply 
with closed eyes, but in corporal punishment and ultimately in death.  According to the Officer 
it is only when the Condemned Man begins to die, that he finally understands: “Die ersten 
sechs Stunden lebt der Verurteilte fast wie früher, er leidet nur Schmerzen […] Wie still wird 
dann aber der Mann um die sechste Stunde! Verstand geht dem Blödesten auf” [emphasis 
added] (219).  Deciphering the script[ure] of the Old Commandant’s legal documents requires, 
therefore, not so much mystical meditation, but corporal wounds.  The Officer says to the 
Traveler: “Sie haben gesehen, es ist nicht leicht, die Schrift mit den Augen zu entziffern; unser 
Mann entziffert sie aber mit seinen Wunden” (219). 
The term Schrift itself can be deciphered with wounds, particularly through indirect 
associations in its verb form schreiben (“to write”).  Stanley Corngold hints at this possibility in 
analyzing a phrase of the Officer that refers to the wounded areas of the Condemned Man 
(wundbeschriebene Stellen).  The Officer uses this phrase during his description of the execution 
machine’s cotton bedding.  Preparing for the script[ure] to sink in ever more deeply, the cotton 
bedding stops the bleeding on places of the man’s body that have been written sore with 
wounds: “Inzwischen legen sich die wundbeschriebenen Stellen auf die Watte, welche infolge 
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der besonderen Präparierung sofort die Blutung stillt und zu neuer Vertiefung der Schrift 
vorbereitet” [emphasis added] (218-219).  Corngold notes that the phrase wundbeschriebene 
Stellen (“places written sore”) in Kafka’s narrative develops out of a phonetic association with 
the familiar phrase wundgeriebene Stellen (“places rubbed sore”):  
“[…] Kafka has invented a German phrase, wundbeschriebene Stellen.  German 
has a similar- sounding phrase, the familiar expression wundgeriebene Stellen, 
which means, literally, “places [on the body]” (Stellen) that have been “rubbed” 
(gerieben) “sore” (wund).  Kafka uses the phonic resemblance between gerieben 
(rubbed) and beschrieben (described, “be-written”) to indicate the wounds that 
the writing inflicts.” (Corngold, Kafka’s Collected Stories 44)   
In much the same way, the term wundschreiben, implied in Kafka’s use of the phrase 
wundbeschriebene Stellen, might develop out of a verbal process that points to the writing 
procedure in the fictional narrative.  Like the operation of the execution machine that combines 
a writing procedure and a slow, wounding procedure, the term appears to develop out of a 
verbal process that adds wund (“wound”) to a verb that already creates friction or rubs [the 
skin], schreiben.  The term schreiben can refer, in this way, to a type of inscribing, a writing with 
wounds that closely resembles the writing procedure in the Penal Colony.35     
                                                          
35 The most direct connection between the term schreiben and the writing of a scripture as wounds can be found 
historically in figurative expressions, particularly in those of Judeo-Christianity.  If read literally, these figures 
express that the Heilige Schrift should be written through the human body.  In the Bible, God says to the people of 
Israel, for example: “Ich will mein Gesetz geben in ihren Sinn, und in ihr Herz will ich es schreiben […]” (Hebräer 8, 
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The further details of this writing procedure appears traceable, in part, through a term 
that generally refers to writing as a type of inscribing, gravieren (“to engrave”).36  It can mean 
to engrave an object, not only with an artistic drawing or with intricate patterns, but with the 
verbal signs of a Schrift: “eine zeichnung, ein ornament oder schriftzeichen in [etwas] 
einschneiden, eingraben” (DW 8, 2236).  The same verb form also carries the historical sense of 
burdening a person with guilt or with a judgment: “allgemein 'belasten', mit einem 
gerichtsurteil, einer schuld […]” (DW 8, 2235).37  In this way, a sentence historically implicit in 
the Officer’s judgment of the Condemned Man under the Old Law, such as Der Mann wurde mit 
einem Urteil graviert (“The man was burdened with a judgment”),38 could be interpreted as 
“The man was inscribed with a judgment.”  This interpretation might partly explain why the 
Condemned Man literally carries his judgment as a Schrift of intricate patterns, inscribed into 
his body.  Explaining this judgment to the Traveler, the Officer describes the Schrift as follows: 
“Es darf natürlich keine einfache Schrift sein; sie soll ja nicht sofort töten […] Es müssen also 
viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib nur 
in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” (218).  In this way, 
                                                          
10).  It is possible that the violent writing procedure of Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” developed out of a literal 
reading of such figures.    
36 Detlef Kremer has associated the verb schreiben, through the Greek graphein, with eingravieren: “Der 
Zusammenhang von ‘graben’ und ‘schreiben’ ist über das griechische ‘graphein’ etymologisch möglich, Schreiben 
ist ein Vorgang des Eingravierens” (141). 
37 This is a legal variation of the more general meaning of the term gravieren: “to lay a burden on somebody” or 
“to burden somebody” (“jem. etwas zur last legen, jem. (mit etw.) belasten,” DW 8, 2235).    
38 See Section I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case (pg.33). 
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the language that is “In der Strafkolonie,” like the script[ure] of the Penal Colony under the Old 
Law, can be read as words that are wounds.39  It is these wounds that seem to ultimately 
communicate the legal message of the Old Commandant, and yet the Officer’s explanations or 
his words appear, on the other hand, powerless to convey it.  In this way, the Officer’s 
explanations of the Old Law to the Traveler actually form the axis around which the Penal 







                                                          
39 A similar connection can be found, for example, between a song and suffering.  Though not explicitly found in “In 
der Strafkolonie,” this is a connection that Kafka appears to make, though in the reverse, in a personal confession 
to his friend Milena Jesenskà: “Niemand singt so rein als die, welche in der tiefsten Hölle sind” (Briefe 1918 318).  
The connection Kafka appears to make between suffering and a song just as easily could have been inspired by the 
verbal association Leid/Lied, as it could have been a product of his overall experience as a writer.  In fact, as 
Stanley Corngold has critically noted, Edwin and Willa Muir, greatly respected in the first half of the twentieth 
century, but also often blamed for taking liberties in Kafka translation, must have recognized this possibility and 
translated Lcentury, but also often blamed for taking liberties in Kafka translation, must have recognized this 
possibility and translated Leid as “song” in their 1938 version of Kafka’s Amerika (Lambent Traces 183).       
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Chapter II: In the Penal Colony, under the New Law 
“Die Lüge wird zur Weltordnung gemacht”- Franz Kafka40    
“You might think love of humanity in general was safe, but it is not.  If you leave out justice you will find yourself 
breaking agreements and faking evidence in trials ‘for the sake of humanity,’ and become in the end a cruel and 
treacherous man”- C.S. Lewis41  
 
The New Law of the Penal Colony, under the authority of the New Commandant, is a 
human law that ultimately manifests itself in the destruction of the inhumane machine.  The 
circumstances that surround the destruction of the machine can be seen as the ultimate 
consequence and literal rendering of the multitude of figurative frictions, breaks, or tears in the 
Old Law, as they are found, and appear to originate, in the Officer’s explanations to the Traveler 
or in verbal utterances of the Old Law.  Contradictory expressions, like divisions in the Old 
Commandant’s authority and judgment or the many heads of the court, seem to manifest 
themselves as breaks in the actual structure and operation of the Old Commandant’s execution 
machine or, by extension, as tears in the physical body of the Officer himself.  Under the New 
Law, men figuratively and literally “break the law” (das Gesetz brechen).   
 
                                                          
40 Der Proceß (233). 
41 Mere Christianity (24). 
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II.1.The Explanations of the Officer 
The transition from the Old Law to the New Law appears to originate in the Officer’s 
explanations to the Traveler.  There are numerous occurrences during these explanations that 
uniquely correspond to the operation of the Old Commandant’s execution machine as it writes 
its script[ure] on the body of the Condemned Man.  These parallels, however, only serve to 
strengthen the impression that this New Law is fully different than the one that preceded it.  It 
is expressed as words to the Traveler, not impressed as wounds on the body of the Condemned 
Man.  One of these parallels between the Old Law and the New Law can be found where the 
narrator refers to the Officer’s readiness to provide the Traveler with the most thorough 
explanations of the machine and its operation.  The narrator says: [Der Offizier] beugte sich 
freundlich zu dem Reisenden vor, bereit zu den umfassendsten Erklärungen” [emphasis added] 
(214).  The adjective umfassendste, which in this case defines the Officer’s planned 
explanations as “most comprehensive,” also carries the sense of “touching” and of “encircling.”  
The image of the Officer, presented here, potentially corresponds exactly to the planned 
execution procedure of the Penal Colony’s legal machine, as the Officer describes it.  Its 
script[ure] is to be written on, and around, the entire body of the Condemned Man: “Es müssen 
also viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib 
nur in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” (218).   
The Officer’s explanations, however, are not written on the physical body of the 
Traveler, the way the script[ure] is to be written on the physical body of the Condemned Man.  
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This may be explained, in part, through a historic shift within the term that names the Officer’s 
explanations.  Etymologically, the word Erklärung is related to the noun Klärung and to the verb 
klären, meaning “to purify” or “to clarify” in both the literal and figurative sense.  Within this 
context, the word Erklärung could refer to a “Verklärung” (DW 3, 876),42 or through the Latin to 
the literal “transfiguratio” [emphasis added] (DW 25, 654).43  And yet currently, it 
predominately denotes a type of verbal expression or “explanation.”  Indeed, when the Officer 
explains, to the Traveler, one of the decisive moments surrounding the transfiguration of the 
Condemned Man under the Old Law, he appears to do so through this verbal transition.  The 
Officer says: “Wie nahmen wir alle den Ausdruck der Verklärung von dem gemarterten Gesicht 
[…]” [emphasis added] (216).  The Condemned Man’s Verklärung (“transfiguration”) is no 
Ausdruck der Verklärung (“expression of transfiguration”), much less the Officer’s Erklärung 
(“explanation”).  The shift from the Old Law, or from the full transfiguration of the Condemned 
Man’s physical body in the reading of a script[ure], to the New Law, or to the Officer’s verbal 
explanations of this transformation to the Traveler, might be a transition in how the term 
Erklärung is read: from the literal, umfassendste Verklärung to a figurative Erklärung.44   
                                                          
42 Under “Erklärung,” the DW makes reference to “Keisersb. bilg. 217” (Geiler von Keisersberg, Christenlich 
bilgerschafft zum ewige[n] vatterla[n]d…, 1512, 217) quoting the following in order to demonstrate a cross-
referencing between Erklärung and Verklärung: “die erklerung Christi uf dem berg Tabor.”       
43 A Latin reading is possible here because the Officer’s explanations are not in German but in French (207).          
44 There are many other associations with the term Erklärung that appear to illuminate, in their own unique way, 
many of the other important images and events of “In der Strafkolonie.”  While they cannot all be addressed in this 
paper, one that is particularly relevant to the above discussion involves the noun der Eindruck.  Much like the 
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II.2.Persuasive, in Part, but No Power 
According to the Officer, the problem with his explanations is that they are without 
power.  When speaking to the Traveler confidentially about the present reality of the Penal 
Colony and general difficulty in maintaining its execution machine, the Officer says to the 
Traveler: “Die Überzeugungskraft des alten Kommandanten habe ich zum Teil, aber seine 
Macht fehlt mir ganz” [emphasis added] (224).  The Überzeugungskraft, that the Officer still at 
least partly possesses, potentially refers, not just to “persuasiveness” in speech or argument, 
but also to “power of persuasion,” even, in a certain literal sense, power that persuades 
(“Überzeugungskraft”).  In this way, the Old Law and execution machine, which convince with 
ruthless power, is an image that develops out of a certain reading of this term.45  On the other 
hand, when the Officer admits that he lacks the Old Commandant’s power, he might do so 
because another reading of the same term, in over-emphasizing “Überzeugung(s-),” might lose 
sight of its root, “-kraft.”  Like the Officer and his explanations to the Traveler under the New 
Law, this word is full of conviction and intent on persuasion, but with no power; it is, quite 
literally, unconvincing.  On the semantic level, the reader shares the Officer’s surprised 
recognition at the end of the story, as he realizes that he has not convinced the Traveler and 
                                                          
transition from the Old Law to the New Law of the Penal Colony, a figurative Ausdruck (“expression”) excludes a 
literal Eindruck (“impression”).  
45 The image in the text that seems to develop, most directly, out of this and other associations in the term 
Überzeugungskraft can be found right before the planned execution, when the Soldier, at the command of the 
Officer, forcefully cuts the “tattered clothing” (Zeug) off the Condemned Man’s body and lifts him over it, implicitly 
“über das Zeug” (220).  According to a certain literal reading, the Officer has convinced the Condemned Man of the 
Law or Truth in the fullest sense of the word: “Er hat ihn überzeugt.”    
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that the Traveler will not follow the Old Commandant’s legal system: “‘Das Verfahren hat Sie 
also nicht überzeugt,’ sagte er für sich” (236).  In a play on words, the Traveler might “hear” the 
words of the Officer but, unlike the Condemned Man under the Old Law, he will surely not 
“obey” him, the reality of which can be read in the etymological split between hören and 
gehorchen (DW 5, 2502).46  In the same way, he might even “understand” the words of the 
Officer, but he certainly will not “follow” the Old Commandant or the procedural demands of 
the machine, the possibility of which can be traced through an ambiguity in the verb folgen.47  
The full transition to the New Law of the Penal Colony might develop out of conflicts within 
such terms:  in German, as in English, for example, following verbal explanations of the Old Law 
is not following the Old Law.  The New Law is, therefore, a type of verbal rebellion that breaks 
the law.  Originating in the Officer’s explanations to the Traveler, the New Law consists in the 
verbal expressions of [ex-] followers, voicing untruths or contradictions.       
 
                                                          
46 The term gehorchen meant “to hear” or “to listen attentively” (“hören, aufmerksam hören,” DW 5, 2501) before 
taking on its current meaning “to obey” (DW 5, 2502).  The verb horchen means “to listen attentively,” though 
historically it could have come close to gehorchen in its current usage “to obey”: “horchen rührt 
an gehorchen, oder ist ihm in einigen stellen geradezu gleich” (DW 10, 1803).  The verb hören, though similar in 
appearance and clearly related to both gehorchen and horchen, historically contains little traces of the meaning “to 
obey” and currently means simply “to hear” (DW 10, 1806-1812).  It is possible that the Traveler’s inability to obey 
the Old Law in hearing about it from the Officer is rooted in this verbal separation between gehorchen and hören.          
47 The Officer says to the Traveler, for example: “Ich will nämlich den Apparat zuerst beschreiben und dann erst die 
Prozedur selbst ausführen lassen.  Sie werden ihr dann besser folgen können” [emphasis added] (207).      
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II.3.Listening to the [Ex-] Followers in the Teahouse 
According to the Officer, the consequence of his powerless and unconvincing 
explanations is that open followers of the Old Commandant have diminished considerably.  
They will no longer admit their allegiance and can instead be found in the teahouse voicing 
verbal expressions that are nothing more than contradictory or ambiguous utterances.  He says 
to the Traveler:         
[I]nfolgedessen haben sich die Anhänger verkrochen, es gibt noch viele, aber 
keiner gesteht es ein. Wenn Sie heute, also an einem Hinrichtungstag, ins 
Teehaus gehen und herumhorchen, werden Sie vielleicht nur zweideutige 
Äußerungen hören.  Das sind lauter Anhänger, aber unter dem gegenwärtigen 
Kommandanten und bei seinen gegenwärtigen Anschauungen für mich ganz 
unbrauchbar. [emphasis added] (224)       
The followers’ change in behavior, as the Officer has described it, seems to be located in the 
language of the expression that the Officer uses in defining them.  The phrase lauter Anhänger, 
which defines them as “simply followers,” might be perceived in different ways as it would be 
articulated.  Through terminal devoicing, the phrase lauter Anhänger might actually signify 
lautere Anhänger: “pure and clear followers,” in the moral and linguistic sense.48  For the same 
                                                          
48 In DW, there are numerous definitions and explanations for the adverb “lauter.”  In the given context, the 11th 
entry in particular seems of interest: “aus dem begriff des reinen in den des sündefreien umschlagend […] aber 




reason of terminal devoicing, the phrase that is actually articulated, though one means to say 
lautere or even lauter Anhänger, may be laute Anhänger: “loud followers,” also carrying the 
sense of “followers that speak.” 49  Consistent with the Officer’s description, the followers of 
the Old Law in the teahouse are no longer pure followers, and they no longer unambiguously 
express their allegiance because, according to a phonetic transition through terminal devoicing 
(lautere-lauter-laute), the followers in the teahouse are no longer “pure and clear followers” 
(lautere Anhänger).  They are simply “loud followers” or “followers that speak” (laute 
Anhänger), voicing verbal expressions that must be contradictory or ambiguous.  
The Officer associates the ambiguous expressions of the followers that are heard in the 
teahouse with something essential to the nature of the New Commandant and his influences.  
In the same way, the reader might recognize this in interpreting his name, der gegenwärtige 
Kommandant.  For instance, the word Gegenwart is related to the noun Gegner and could be 
used, historically, in legal and communicative contexts, describing oppositional parties and 
verbal attacks: “wie da die gegner gegen einander handeln, redden […], so hiesz diesz 
entgegenstehen beider ihre gegenwart” [emphasis added] (DW 5, 2285).50  In this way, the 
gegenwärtige Kommandant or the “current commandant” can also be read as the “oppositional 
                                                          
49 In DW, there are numerous definitions and explanations for the adverb “laut.”  In the given context, the 5th entry 
seems of particular interest: “laut heiszt auch nur ausgesprochen, im gegensatz des bloszen denkens oder 
stummen wissens” (DW 12, 368). 
50 This legal sense of the term Gegenwart was derived from the original sense of a “hostile confrontation”: “die 
ursprüngliche bed. eines feindlichen entgegenstehens, die uns in widerwärtig noch anklingt […]” (DW 5, 2285).   
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and contradictory commandant.”  The oppositional influence of the New Commandant of the 
Penal Colony manifests itself, quite literally, in contradictory expressions.  Like those of the 
Condemned Man, when allowed to speak, the verbal expressions of followers, under the New 
Commandant, cannot be truthful in the unambiguous sense.              
      
II.4.The Lies of the Condemned Man 
When the Officer refers theoretically to the consequences of interrogating the 
Condemned Man before convicting him, or of allowing him the opportunity to speak on his 
behalf, he says that the content of the Condemned Man’s speech would be nothing but a 
network of confusion and lies: “Hätte ich den Mann zuerst vorgerufen und ausgefragt, so wäre 
nur Verwirrung entstanden.  Er hätte gelogen, hätte, wenn es mir gelungen wäre, die Lügen zu 
widerlegen, diese durch neue Lügen ersetzt und so fort” (213).  The Officer’s presumption of 
lying on the part of the Condemned Man can, perhaps, partly be explained through associations 
within the term liegen.  Historically, it was often figuratively associated, in various ways, with 
death.  The double-verb construction schlafen-liegen, for example, could have meant “to be 
dead” (“todt sein,” DW 12, 1002).  Yet, the verb lügen (“to tell lies”) can also appear, for 
example, in the Middle High German infinitive and in certain conjugations, in the same form as 
the current liegen: “gott ist nicht ein mensch, das er liege” (DW 12, 1273).51  This apparent 
relationship between liegen and lügen might give the impression that the Condemned Man, 
                                                          
51 4 Mos. 23, 19 (DW 12, 1273). 
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who physically lies and dies [on a bed], under the Old Law, must verbally lie under the New 
Law.52    
The reason for the lies or confusion, with regard to the Officer as interrogator or 
questioner, can similarly be traced through an apparent ambiguity in the verb, besides 
ausfragen, that names his interrogation or his act of questioning: Verhör or verhören.53  A 
negating effect in the prefix ver (verhören) might define the Officer’s behavior under the Old 
Law, ignoring or not hearing the pleas of the Condemned Man.  However, for a similar reason, it 
can also mean to hear falsely (“falsch, unrichtig hören”), currently seen exclusively in the 
reflexive “sich verhören” (DW 25, 584).  From this verbal perspective, like that of the Officer’s, 
it is to be expected that confusion and lies would be the only conceivable outcome in an 
interrogation of the Condemned Man.  If he were free to speak, or to act, that speech must be 
untrue and those actions lawless.  Under the New Law, in which the Condemned Man is freed, 
men break the law.    
 
                                                          
52 For a further analysis of the Condemned Man’s death on a bed, particularly as it can be traced through figurative 
associations within the verb schlafen, see also I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple Case (pg.33).  
53 In the theoretical words of the Traveler, describing the legal procedure in his home country, the Officer 
expresses what would be this interrogative aspect of the New Law of the Penal Colony: “Bei uns wird der 
Angeklagte vor dem Urteil verhört” [emphasis added] (229).  
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II.5.The Human(e) Ideals of the Traveler 
The transition from the Old Law to the New Law in the Penal Colony is ultimately the 
transition from a mechanical law to a human law.  This is perhaps nowhere more evident than 
at the end of the story, when the Officer frees the Condemned Man, shortly before the 
machine self-destructs: “‘Du bist frei,’ sagte der Offizier zum Verurteilten […] Zum erstenmal 
bekam das Gesicht des Verurteilten wirkliches Leben” (237).  The origins of this transition can 
be located, however, much earlier in a verbal shift, hinted at in the thoughts of the Traveler 
regarding the Old Law.  When the Traveler privately considers his role in intervening against the 
Old Law’s legal procedure, he thinks to himself: “Die Ungerechtigkeit des Verfahrens und die 
Unmenschlichkeit der Exekution war zweifellos” (222).  Though in a more specific form, the 
Traveler’s thoughts have expressed exactly what the Officer had voiced earlier, when defining 
his principle of judgment under the Old Law: “Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” (212).  The 
difference appears to lie in the Traveler’s specific interpretation of an otherwise general 
concept: he assigns undeniable guilt, not to everything, or to men as the Officer does, but to a 
machine.  Ultimately, the Traveler’s ability to define the machine’s procedure as inhumane, and 
to absolutely justify its replacement with a human one, is the result of his understanding of the 
law, one that might develop out of an opposition in the terms unmenschlich and menschlich.  
Just as there is nothing inherently violent in the term Exekution, as demonstrated earlier,54 the 
adjective unmenschlich, while typically signifying “inhumane,” actually only negates the human 
                                                          
54 See Section I.5.The Law as an Execution (pg.36). 
61 
 
quality of its root, Mensch.  Literally and historically, it simply denotes a non-human or not-
human quality: “nichtmenschlich” (DW 24, 1176).  In this way, the otherwise accusatory 
expression of the Traveler, “die Unmenschlichkeit der Exekution ist zweifellos,” could be 
interpreted as the executive procedures are undoubtedly not-human, an interpretation that 
might simply express the undeniably authoritative, abstract, and transcendent nature of the 
law or the not-human quality of a machine.  That which would assign a “cruel” or “barbarous” 
element to the term unmenschlich is, from this perspective, only a secondary derivative or 
interpretive possibility, one that is nonetheless unavoidable in the typical or modern reading of 
it.  For both the Officer of the Penal Colony and the reader of “In der Strafkolonie,” an inhuman 
law must also be inhumane.  In the same way but in the reverse, a law that is menschlich, 
according to the Traveler, is not just one that is “humane,” it must also be “human,” a transition 
or reading that is, on the other hand, foreign to the nature of a transcendent law or to the 
structure and operation of a machine.  Under the present authority and practice of the New 
Commandant and modern Traveler, the law is interpreted as a human law, embodied in the 
form of a human legal apparatus.   
 
II.6.The Human Apparatus 
The reversal of the Old Law from a mechanical law to a human law in the Penal Colony 
can be seen, perhaps most directly, in places where certain human functions in the machine 
strangely break with its mechanical and deadly operation.  While these might serve to further 
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highlight the machine’s brutality, they also seem to hint at an equally extreme and potentially 
destructive transformation in its structure and operation.  Under the New Law, the machine 
and its brutally operating parts appear to constitute a human legal apparatus of grossly 
functioning men.  The execution machine, for instance, does not simply stab the naked 
Condemned Man.  According to a figurative reading, it might clothe him in an absurd fashion: 
the script that is written as wounds on the Condemned Man’s body is expressed, by the Officer, 
in figures that signify clothes, consisting wholly in extensive and intricate decorations.  The 
Officer says to the Traveler: “Es müssen also viele, viele Zieraten die eigentliche Schrift 
umgeben; die wirkliche Schrift umzieht den Leib nur in einem schmalen Gürtel; der übrige 
Körper ist für Verzierungen bestimmt” [emphasis added] (218).  The image of the script as 
clothing decorations may develop, in part, out of the word that names the sharp, writing 
instruments of the machine.  The Spitzen can be read, not just as “needles,” but also as a type 
of decorative cloth with intricate patterns (“lace”).  One of the most important functions of the 
execution machine, die Spitzen verzieren den Körper (“the needles decorate the body”), might 
develop as an outcome of this alternative reading.  The Spitzen of the machine place extensive 
and intricate decorative patterns on the body, not because they are sharp needles, but because 
they are lace.  As already hinted at in the Officer’s description of the image on the body of the 
Condemned Man, the transition from a dead body, naked and rent with wounds, to a living 
body, clothed and blanketed in ornament, might be the result of a reading of a word that 
names specific structures of the machine.   
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The clearest image of this actual transition in the law seems to be hinted at in a 
description of the Officer’s clothes.  The Officer, who like the machine is an embodiment of the 
law, is a human, dressed in decorated military garb.  Most tellingly perhaps, in one of the few 
moments when the Traveler’s admiration for the Officer increases, his focus remains almost 
entirely on this uniform: 
[…] die Sonne verfing sich allzustark in dem schattenlosen Tal, man konnte 
schwer seine Gedanken sammeln.  Um so bewundernswerter erschien ihm der 
Offizier, der im engen, parademäßigen, mit Epauletten beschwerten, mit 
Schnürren behängten Waffenrock so eifrig seine Sache erklärte […] (206) 
Indeed, the Officer’s decorated uniform, as admired by the Traveler, might partly originate in a 
creative manipulation and interpretation of his linguistic body or his name, Offizier (“an officer, 
whose glory consists in decorations”).55   
Just as the Officer’s legal procedure does not simply stab the Condemned Man but 
might clothe him, it also does not simply kill him.  One of the most important aspects of its 
operation strangely consists, for instance, in feeding him.  The Condemned Man can eat 
whenever he desires, during the execution.  The Officer says to the Traveler: “Hier in diesen 
elektrisch geheizten Napf am Kopfende wird warmer Reisbrei gelegt, aus dem der Mann, wenn 
er Lust hat, nehmen kann […]” (219).  This function of the machine and the behavior it allows 
                                                          
55 The noun Zier historically refers to “glanz, schönheit, herrlichkeit, pracht, schmuck” (DW 31, 1140).    
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curiously imitates, to some degree, a particularly grotesque practice of the New Commandant 
and seems to represent one of the primary activities of freed men under his influence.  The 
operation of the machine, for example, is delayed because the Condemned Man was stuffed 
full of sweets by the ladies of the New Commandant and consequently throws up on the 
machine.  After the Condemned Man had fully recovered, during this delay, he instinctively 
reaches for the food, immediately as it is made available to him: “Der Soldat hatte die 
Reinigungsarbeit beendet und jetzt noch aus einer Büchse Reisbrei in den Napf geschüttet.  
Kaum merkte dies der Verurteilte, der sich schon vollständig erholt zu haben schien, als er mit 
der Zunge nach dem Brei zu schnappen begann” (226-227).  Such images of eating in the Penal 
Colony might be explained, among other ways, through the reading of a term the Officer often 
uses in referring to the law, Gericht.  It carries the sense, not just of the “court,” or apparatus of 
legal judgment, but also of a “dish [of food].”  According to this reading, the court of the Penal 
Colony might be something, not under which men are brutally judged, but around which men 
grossly eat.  In the same way verbally, the operation of the legal apparatus in the current Penal 
Colony consists in bodily functions and human behavior or of the functions and judgments of 
human authorities.     
65 
 
II.7.The Many Heads of the Court 
The human legal apparatus of the Penal Colony also manifests itself in an undermining 
of the Old Commandant’s singular authority and principle of judgment.  Certain confessions and 
inconsistencies in the Officer’s statement on judgment point to this:56   
Ich bin hier in der Strafkolonie zum Richter bestellt.  Trotz meiner Jugend.  Denn 
ich stand auch dem früheren Kommandanten in allen Strafsachen zur Seite und 
kenne auch den Apparat am besten.  Der Grundsatz, nach dem ich entscheide, 
ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos.  Andere Gerichte können diesen Grundsatz 
nicht befolgen, denn sie sind vielköpfig und haben auch noch höhere Gerichte 
über sich.  Das ist hier nicht der Fall, oder war es wenigstens nicht beim früheren 
Kommandanten.  Der neue hat allerdings schon Lust gezeigt, in mein Gericht sich 
einzumischen, es ist mir aber bisher gelungen, ihn abzuwehren, und wird mir 
auch weiter gelingen. (212)      
Although confident in his claims that the Old Commandant’s principle of judgment can be 
followed in the current Penal Colony because the court does not consist of various authorities 
and is not subject to higher courts, the Officer also appears to confess a fair amount of 
                                                          
56 The Officer’s statement on judgment is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.3.One Principle: The Certainty of Guilt 
(pg.32).  In this section, the Officer is presented as the sole authority or judge with one principle under which he 
judges a legal case in the Penal Colony: the certainty of guilt.      
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uncertainty in this regard.  He can only be certain that this was the case in the past and under 
the direct leadership of the Old Commandant.   
The Officer’s uncertainties appear to be grounded in the current, divided structure of 
the court, which can be demonstrated through apparent contradictions in the Officer’s 
statements.  For example, the Officer has not only been appointed judge in the Penal Colony by 
a higher authority, his failure to actually name this authority also leaves open the possibility 
that some other, higher authority, besides the Old Commandant, has appointed him.  
Furthermore, an apparent contradiction in the Officer’s statement on the principle of judgment 
might actually separate his authority, in matters of judgment, from the higher authority that 
has appointed him.  Instead of declaring the Old Commandant’s principle of judgment, as it 
seems he intends to do, the Officer announces, in fact, his principle: “Der Grundsatz, nach dem 
ich entscheide, ist: Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” [emphasis added] (212).  Though contrary 
to his claims, the Officer’s court, under the New Law and influence of the New Commandant, is 
subject to higher courts, and it consists of various authorities, only one of which is the Officer.                       
When the Officer describes the actual operation of this court in the simple case of the 
Condemned Man, subtle word associations also seem to contradict his closing assertion that 
the New Commandant and his many-headed court have not yet succeeded, and perhaps never 
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will succeed, in influencing his.57  The Officer says: “Ein Hauptmann hat heute morgens die 
Anzeige erstattet, daβ dieser Mann, der ihm als Diener zugeteilt ist und vor seiner Türe schläft, 
den Dienst verschlafen hat […] [Er] kam vor einer Stunde zu mir, ich schrieb seine Angaben auf 
und anschließend gleich das Urteil [emphasis added] (212-213).  If it is true, as the Officer 
claims, that other courts of law, or the New Commandant’s courts of law, consist of many 
authorities or are “vielköpfig,” so too is his law, according to this description.  A “Hauptmann” 
is the one who experienced the violation by the servant or Condemned Man, issued the charges 
against him and brought them to the Officer.  The term Haupt literally means “der Kopf” or “the 
human head” and seems to suggest that other men with heads or other heads are involved in 
the Officer’s court and not just one, as he claims.  Under the New Law and influence of the New 
Commandant, the court of the Penal Colony is no longer a court of one authority with one legal 
judgment.  As we will see, it is a court of many men with differing opinions.58                   
                                                          
57 The case of the Condemned Man is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.4.The Condemned Man and the Simple 
Case (pg.33).  In this case, the Condemned Man is found sleeping, although he is required to stand and salute.  The 
case is presented to the Officer, and the Officer immediately sentences the Condemned Man to death.  
58 Historically, the term vielköpfig was often used in pejoratively describing the opinions of the masses and has also 
often been used together with figures of animals or monstrosities.  In this sense, a many-headed legal court and its 
many judgments might be like an animalistic mob or a monstrous horde: “so wird das volk, der grosze haufe, das 
'publikum,’ der pöbel ein vielköpfig thier, ungeheuer u. ä. genannt […]” (the quote makes reference to “Horaz, 
epist. 1, 1, 76,” DW 26, 193).  This verbal coupling within the adjective might explain the second crime of the 
Condemned Man.  He not only rebels against his captain’s orders and judgment, he literally threatens to kill him by 
eating him alive as a vicious animal would: “‘Wirf die Peitsche weg, oder ich fresse dich”’ [emphasis added] (213).  
Like the threat of the Condemned Man, the term vielköpfig perhaps most clearly and grotesquely anticipates the 
lawless judgments of men under the New Law.               
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II.8.The Traveler’s Authority and Judgment 
The Traveler seems to function as a representative of the new authorities in the New 
Commandant’s court, evidenced in the nature of his authority and legal judgment.  He judges, 
not as a superior authority, but as a man with an opinion, a development that seems to 
originate in a reversal in how the Old Law is understood or out of a reversed reading of the law, 
“Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten” (“Honor thy superiors,” 210).  Unlike the Condemned Man under 
the Old Law, the Traveler only appears to understand it in obeying the forceful commands and 
physical demands of his superior Officer.  When, for example, the Traveler learns from the 
Officer that the Condemned Man has had no opportunity to defend himself under the Old Law, 
he immediately stands up and says: “‘Er muß doch Gelegenheit gehabt haben, sich zu 
verteidigen’” [emphasis added] (212), a strong physical gesture and forceful statement that 
might be interpreted as an attempt or willingness to “physically defend” (verteidigen) the 
Condemned Man himself.  The Officer appears to understand the Traveler’s gesture and 
remark, or the word verteidigen, in this way or as a physical threat, for in response to the 
Traveler’s illegal behavior, the Officer not only “urges” the Traveler to sit down before him and 
to quietly listen to his explanation, but he also “forces” him to do so: “Er nötigte den Reisenden 
auf den Sessel nieder […]” [emphasis added] (213).  The Traveler, it might seem, submits to the 
Old Law, under which defense of the Condemned Man, in any form, is strictly forbidden and 
commands are physically enforced.  However, there is another way to read the image.  If the 
military Officer is forceful in standing, the intellectual Traveler, who, despite his gesture, is 
clearly no “military defender” but more likely a “legal [one]” (Verteidiger), is forceful in sitting: 
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he defends, not with his physical body, but with his mind and with language.  Indeed, according 
to the literal reading of a word, the Officer has actually forced the Traveler into the seated 
position, not just of a legal defender, but of an even higher legal authority, who sides with the 
Condemned Man.  As the Traveler is sitting or is seated before the Officer, his gesture might 
literally enact a term that names “leaders [of an assembly]” or the “superior(s)” in the Penal 
Colony.  He has assumed the position of a Vorsitzenden or a Vorgesetzten, an absurd, verbal 
twist that reverses the Old Law as it makes a mockery of it.  If the Condemned Man had been 
forced earlier to honor his superior(s), the Officer must now honor those that are seated in 
front of him or simply the man or any man that sits in a chair.  According to a certain literal 
reading of a word, the Traveler is to be honored as an authority or judge in the Penal Colony.       
The nature and effectiveness of the Traveler’s judgment in the Penal Colony is clearly 
related to his authority under the New Law but can be, it seems, most directly linked to an 
alternate reading of the term that refers to it (Urteil).  The word can refer, in a Judeo-Christian 
context, to a “Godly judgment”: “Wenn du das Urteil lässest hören vom Himmel, so erschrickt 
das Erdreich und wird still” [emphasis added] (Psalm 76.9) and, by further verbal association, to 
a “Verurteilung” or “conviction” that also carries the unavoidable sense of “condemnation” or 
“damnation.”  However, it can also refer, not only to a “logical judgment,” but, in matters of 
taste, to a “personal opinion.”  Therefore, a potentially extreme shift in the interpretation of 
legal judgment can already be found where the Officer declares the uselessness of voicing the 
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deadly condemnation to the Condemned Man under the Old Law.59  He says to the Traveler: “Es 
wäre nützlos es [sein eigenes Urteil] ihm [dem Verurteilten] zu verkünden” (211).  In a striking 
reversal, the Officer’s statement can be translated as: It would be impractical to declare to him 
his own [or personal] opinion.  In this way, the transition from a judgment too powerful for 
words to one so personal it cannot be dictated is a shift in how the term Urteil is read.  This 
reading seems to explain the Traveler’s hesitation in condemning the Officer’s legal procedure, 
though he is firmly convinced of its inhumanity.  Condemnation would be impossible, if the 
Traveler‘s stated opinion is no more significant than any other man: “Wenn ich eine Meinung 
aussprechen würde, so wäre es die Meinung eines Privatmannes, um nichts bedeutender als 
die Meinung eines beliebigen anderen […]” [emphasis added] (230).  Yet, it is precisely the 
Traveler’s inability to condemn that seems so destructive to the Old Law or Old Commandant’s 
method of legal judgment in the Penal Colony.  The new superior in the court judges differently, 
or an unresolvable conflict in the term Urteil dictates, not only that the Traveler dissents in his 
final judgment, when he says “Ich bin ein Gegner dieses Verfahrens” (235), but that this 
judgment will fully reverse the Old Commandant’s or Officer’s method of judgment under the 
Old Law.  It will free the Condemned Man and subject the Officer to a new judgment.  
                                                          
59 This declaration of the Officer is introduced in Chapter I, Section I.9.The Undeclared Judgment of the 
Condemned Man (pg.45). 
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II.9.The Revenge of the Condemned Man 
As soon as the Officer frees the Condemned Man, the Officer turns to the Traveler and 
shows him the law or legal document that is to determine the new judgment.  According to the 
Officer, it reads “Sei gerecht” (“Be just,” 238).  The Officer then places this document in the 
drafter, prepares the machine, and removes his clothes.  As this time, the Condemned Man 
appears to notice a great reversal in the law or legal judgment in the Penal Colony.  He notices 
that the Officer will be executed under the machine, and he views the Officer’s death as a 
legitimate act of revenge, likely sanctioned through an order of the Traveler: 
Besonders der Verurteilte schien von der Ahnung eines großen Umschwungs 
getroffen zu sein.  Was ihm geschehen war, geschah nun dem Offizier.  Vielleicht 
würde es bis zum Äußersten gehen.  Wahrscheinlich hatte der fremde Reisende 
den Befehl dazu gegeben.  Das war also Rache.  Ohne selbst bis zum Ende 
gelitten zu haben, wurde er doch bis zum Ende gerächt. [emphasis added] (241)   
A phonetic association in the law or legal document that the Officer reads aloud to the 
Traveler, appears to determine the judgment in this way.  The command Sei gerecht (“Be just”) 
might be phonetically perceived as Sei gerächt (“Be avenged”).  In a phonetic sense, the 
command to be just is much like an order to be avenged.  The Condemned Man might 
experience the Traveler’s judgment as an order for revenge on his behalf, and he might witness 
the Officer’s execution instead of being executed himself, due to this particular association in 
the command Sei gerecht.  It is this reading that might also, at least partly, explain the extreme 
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reversal in judgment under the New Law or the destructive and brutal nature of the Officer’s 
execution.       
 
II.10.The Destruction of the Machine and the Death of the Officer 
Many of the central images surrounding the destruction of the machine, during the 
Officer’s execution at the end of the story, appear to develop out of earlier verbal associations, 
some of which can be directly linked to the Traveler, as the representative of the New Law 
under the New Commandant.  One particularly clear example can be found where the 
Condemned Man is being strapped into the machine and prepared for what is supposed to be 
his execution.  When the Condemned Man lifts his only free arm and points unknowingly in the 
Traveler’s direction, the wrist strap that is being secured to his other arm tears:   
 [Der Verurteilte] streckte, während der Soldat mit seiner rechten Hand 
 beschäftigt war, die linke aus, ohne zu wissen wohin; es war aber die Richtung,  
 wo der Reisende stand […] Der Riemen, der für das Handgelenk bestimmt war, 
 riß [...] [emphasis added] (220-221)      
This scene is particularly revealing, in that it appears to foreshadow the later destruction of the 
machine as a consequence of the Traveler’s authority and judgment.  Most importantly, it 
appears to develop entirely out of words that refer to the Traveler.  For instance, the machine’s 
wrist strap might tear because when the Condemned Man points to where the Traveler stood, 
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he also directs the reader, not just to the Traveler himself, but to his name and to a phonetic 
association within his name: to “der Reisende” and to the homophone, der Reißende (“the man 
who tears”).60  In this verbal sense, the Penal Colony’s execution machine tears, and is 
ultimately destroyed, because the Traveler, or the man who tears, declares himself an enemy of 
the Old Commandant’s legal procedure: “Ich bin ein Gegner dieses Verfahrens” (235).              
The Officer’s brutal death under the machine, as it is destroyed, can likewise be traced 
through verbal associations.  This is perhaps most clearly the case with one of the final images 
of the story, in which the Officer’s forehead is split with the large iron spike of the execution 
machine: “[…] durch die Stirn ging die Spitze des großen eisernen Stachels” (246).  The image 
appears to originate in a figure used by the narrator in expressing the Traveler’s hopes in the 
New Commandant and his intentions for the Penal Colony.  The narrator says: “[Der Reisende] 
setzte einige Hoffnung auf den neuen Kommandanten, der offenbar, allerdings langsam, ein 
neues Verfahren einzuführen beabsichtigte, das dem beschränkten Kopf dieses Offiziers nicht 
eingehen konnte” [emphasis added] (214).  Though, in the figurative sense of the narrator’s 
expression, the New Commandant’s procedure could not enter “the narrow mind of the 
Officer” (dem beschränkten Kopf dieses Offiziers), in the literal sense, it could enter “the small 
                                                          
60 The verb reißen (“to tear”) is historically related to schreiben and zeichnen, still immediately evident in terms 
such as Reißbrett and Umriss or in the English verb “[to] write” [emphasis added] (DW 14, 754).  Thus, “to write” 
and “to draw” also carries the historical sense “to tear.”  Under the New Commandant, the machine might “tear” 
because it “writes” or “draws.”  This association might also explain how the script[ure] or drawings in the Old 
Commandant’s legal documents could become the “Rißwunden” of the Condemned Man (237).  For a further 
discussion of the Old Commandant’s legal documents, see Section I.7.The Precious Legal Documents of the Old 
Commandant (p.39).   
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head of the Officer.”  Ultimately, it is not the Traveler but associations in his name, and in the 
words signifying his thoughts and behavior under the New Commandant, which appear to 
determine much of the event surrounding the destruction of the machine.  The legal procedure 
in the Penal Colony under the New Law, much like under the Old Law, is the verbal process that 














Scholars have consistently, and almost without exception, defined Franz Kafka’s literary 
works as a search for the Law and pursuit of Truth.  Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is one of 
the most profound and ambiguous works of this type.  The task of referencing its symbolism 
and understanding its language can seem, at times, as daunting as that of the Officer and 
Traveler, who search the intricate and indecipherable signs of the Old Commandant’s legal 
documents.  For this reason, the thesis only scratches the surface of an attempt to trace Kafka’s 
search for the Law in a story to which possible scholarly approaches seem almost limitless.  Axel 
Hecker, for example, declares the story an entire western-philosophical history, a 
“Geistesgeschichte en miniature” (87).61  If, for Hecker, Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is a 
philosophical history, it is also possible, that the story could be read from an entirely different 
perspective or as an Eastern philosophical history.  Kafka, though a Western-European and 
Jewish writer, went so far as to call himself Chinese,62 while a few of Kafka’s fragments or short 
stories, most notably “Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer” (1917), appear to be located in the 
Orient.  According to Mark Anderson,63 the central metaphors of “In der Strafkolonie” are long-
                                                          
61 Through a post-modern lens, Hecker traces the Officer’s religious Idealism, through the Traveler’s enlightened 
Rationalism, to the Condemned Man’s humanistic Materialism. 
62 In May 1916, two years after writing “In der Strafkolonie,” Kafka declared in a letter to Felice Bauer: “im Grunde 
bin ich ja Chinese” (Briefe 1914 161). 




known, by Kafka scholars, to have originated in Octave Mirbeau’s novel of 1899, Torture 
Garden, set in China.64  And indeed, the broken verbal imagery in “in der Strafkolonie,” 
particularly of the destroyed writing machine at the narrative’s end, is traceable to eastern 
philosophy.  Though with no reference to Kafka, the renowned literary critic and philosopher 
George Steiner, writes, in a study of western and eastern philosophies of language, for 
example, of “the fragmentation that speech necessarily entails” in eastern philosophic theories 
of language (12).  
However complex its images and historical associations may be, “In der Strafkolonie” 
also simply remains one of Kafka’s twentieth century language myths, fundamentally influenced 
by traditional Judaic language philosophy.  Like many of Kafka’s myths or fictional narratives, 
“In der Strafkolonie” expresses “modern doubts that the law […] can be revealed through 
language, at least human language” (Allen Thiher, Fiction Refracts Science 139).  What makes 
this myth unique, and should also give it a more central place in Kafka’s literary oeuvre, 
however, is that it can actually be read through historical associations in the German language, 
and in remarkable detail.  For the purposes of the thesis, Franz Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” is, 
not so much a German language history, but the history or the story of how Kafka and his 
reader interprets words.  Though a few scholars have convincingly claimed this to be true, and 
partially documented it, for some of Kafka’s major works, this is now the first of Kafka’s stories 
                                                          
64 Much like Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie,” Mirbeau’s novel tells of a French Explorer who visits an Oriental island 
and discovers its refined torture techniques. 
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that has been fully approached in this way.  As was demonstrated in the thesis, Kafka’s entire 
“In der Strafkolonie,” including the setting and its central images and events, seems to be 
rooted in verbal associations.  The fictional, bloodied and broken body of the Law on the 
tropical island in the Penal Colony is the actual body of the metaphor that is “In der 
Strafkolonie”: The legal procedure in the “tropics” is also a verbal operation in “tropes” 
(Tropen), and the reader, like the central characters in the story, interprets it there.  The fact 
that the Traveler leaves the Penal Colony at the end of the narrative, however, suggests 
alternative readings, which provide a mode of escape for the reader.  If Franz Kafka’s “In der 
Strafkolonie” does not control our entire life, or even remind us of its reality, at least it seems 
to determine our experiences as we read it.  The Law of life is death, a Law that must be denied 
if we are to live.  This is an inescapable fact that really gets under our skin.  Es geht uns unter die 
Haut.  And yet, this is, just as assuredly, not the end or the last word.  There are other stories to 
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